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Foreword 
RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH 
The two studies in this publication on Syria’s EU Association 
Agreement depart from fairly divergent assumptions about the long-term 
consequences of economic liberalization under EU auspices but tend to 
converge on the conclusion that, at least in the short run, the 
agreement’s likely costs outweighed its benefits. It gives only 
marginally better access to Europe’s protected agricultural market. 
Syrian industrial goods already have such access but Syrian exports to 
Europe are mostly crude oil anyway; however, Syria’s increasing non-
oil trade with other markets will face discrimination. On the other hand, 
the agreement exposes Syria to de-industrialization and its agriculture to 
European competition. It cripples the state as a generator of backward 
and forward linkages by forcing public sector procurement open to 
European companies. It will produce unemployment and trade deficits. 
The agreement is more disadvantageous to Syria than the agreements 
signed by other Arab countries with the EU; in particular, Syria’s 
agricultural and public procurement markets would be forced open in a 
way these other states did not face while adjustment funding is 
substantially lower.  
 Why should such an inequitable deal have been negotiated? The 
deal calls in question the idea of the EU as a benign actor for whom the 
developmental interests of LDCs are a priority. As Dostal shows, the 
Partnership Agreements have become an instrument for imposing the 
neo-liberalism that favors the core onto the periphery states. But what 
explains Syria’s readiness to accept it? If this agreement was sought as a 
political shield against US hostility, it proved irrelevant. If Syria’s 
negotiators were outmanoeuvred, it makes a contrast to Syria’s 
reputation for tenacious bargaining under Hafiz. If the agreement was 
seen by the reformers as a weapon against entrenched statist interests or 
to credibly “lock-in” reforms, or to evade responsibility, by pointing to 
its legally binding character, for the social consequences of reforms, it 
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contrasts with the Hafiz period when austerity was imposed without a 
major sacrifice of national autonomy. If Syria’s reformers uncritically 
swallowed neo-liberal ideology, even as it is going out of fashion 
elsewhere, the episode shows the costs of authoritarian governance even 
in the hands of reforming technocrats. Syria was lucky that the EU 
declined to ratify the agreement.
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1 
The European Union and Economic 
Reform in Syria 
JÖRG MICHAEL DOSTAL 
Introduction 
This paper analyses the Association Agreement of the European Union 
(EU) with the Syrian Arab Republic, an element of the EU’s ‘European 
Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP), which was ‘initialled’ by EU and Syrian 
negotiators in 2004 but has so far not been ratified. The discussion falls 
into five substantial sections followed by a conclusion.  
 The first section outlines how the Association Agreements of 
the EU with Mediterranean non-EU states contribute to a new neoliberal 
policy of global competitiveness which is based on the transformation of 
the political economy of the state – that is, of its role in the economy. 
Syria is put forward as a critical case with which to analyse such shifts 
in statehood. The second section examines how the EU and other 
international organisations put forward demands for changes in 
developing countries’ political economy in particular, the EU demands 
that developing countries agree to the opening of their domestic markets 
and to large-scale trade liberalisation, irrespective of their stage of socio-
economic development. This push for trade liberalisation has been part 
of the EU’s ‘grand vision’ for a set of ten Mediterranean partner 
countries (including Syria). It was originally supposed to contribute to 
the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010 (European 
Commission 1994). While this goal is unlikely to be realised by the 
original deadline, it nevertheless provided the starting point for a degree 
of ‘regulatory convergence’ (Müller-Jentsch 2005) between the EU and 
Mediterranean countries that has been informed by orthodox neoliberal 
economic doctrine. This concept has been put forward jointly by the EU, 
the international financial institutions and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). Section three proceeds to analyse the draft of the EU-Syrian 
Association Agreement in detail and demonstrates that the provisions 
place high demands on Syria. In particular, the Agreement links political 
and economic issues and contains substantial points that did not feature 
in the other nine Euro-Mediterranean Agreements. The fourth section 
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sketches the history of Syrian economic policy-making and some of the 
main socio-economic challenges facing the country. The fifth section 
outlines the course of Syrian economic reform under the Presidency of 
Bashar al-Asad since 2000. It is suggested that the Syrian government 
has made substantial efforts to follow an agenda of global 
competitiveness but that the structure of Syrian trade, which relies 
heavily on declining oil rents, places question marks against the project 
of full-scale liberalisation of the Syrian economy. In particular, domestic 
demands for social protection from the results of the liberalisation 
process are not addressed in current policy-making.  
 In conclusion, the paper argues that the EU will have to 
negotiate the tension between a simple transmission of the ‘Washington 
consensus’i as regards the liberalisation of global trade and its own 
foreign policy objectives in the region. Thus, EU member states must 
decide whether to assume the position of transmission belt for a 
neoliberal agenda as put forward by the Bretton Woods institutions or, 
alternatively, whether they would be prepared to offer resources and 
long-term commitment to contribute to political re-regulation and 
stabilisation of Syria and the larger Middle East region.  
Defining the politics of global competitiveness 
The concern with global competitiveness is a core element of today’s 
neoliberal capitalism. The political project of neoliberalism emerged in 
the 1970s, became dominant in Anglo-American countries in the early 
1980s and in the member states of the then European Community (EC) 
in the late 1980s (the EC was transformed into the European Union (EU) 
in 1992). It turned into the global framework of reference after the 
dissolution of the state-socialist systems in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union.  
 In brief, neoliberal capitalism is based on a combination of at 
least seven core features that, taken together, enforce the subordination 
of social relations to market discipline: (1) deregulation of the labour 
market and cuts in social and employment standards; (2) privatisation of 
the public sector; (3) removal of barriers to trade such as non-tariff 
barriers (a process which tends to reinforce rather than remove existing 
trade asymmetries which favour the advanced OECD countries); (4) 
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deregulation of financial markets and increased global capital mobility; 
(5) increased commodification of the sphere of education and social 
reproduction; (6) full commodification of agriculture and elimination of 
remnants of subsistence farming; and, last but not least, (7) permanent 
discursive pressure to limit state agency and social reforms in favour of 
accepting market outcomes. In sum, the supporters of the neoliberal 
transition hold that market agency, rather than societal self-organisation 
and regulatory intervention, provides for the best possible coordination 
of competing interests in society, thereby increasing overall welfare.  
 At the same time, most neoliberals have moved beyond the 
simple anti-statism of their classical liberal predecessors. They now 
acknowledge that the interests of capital demand both the selective 
‘rolling back’ and ‘rolling out’ of state agency. What is required is on 
the one hand a ‘competitive state’, moving away from direct service 
provision and towards an indirect and ‘enabling’ function, that serves 
rather than limits the scope of private capital to dominate society. Thus, 
what is ‘rolled back’ is the state’s function as promoter of social 
welfare: the role of organised labour and of social democratic reformism 
declines while the state shifts policy to facilitate the dominance of 
capital at the cost of neglecting the demands of other groups. What is 
‘rolled out’, on the other hand, is the state’s function as a supplier of the 
infrastructure of accumulation and of complementary education systems. 
The process is no longer dominated by earlier quasi-Keynesian policies 
that were largely based on public sector bureaucracies and increases in 
overall public spending. Instead, neoliberal policy facilitates private 
investment into or direct takeover of core functions of the traditional 
public sector. Thus, public spending now needs to be vindicated and 
rhetorically framed as facilitating competitiveness rather than social 
integration. Overall, it is appropriate to suggest that neoliberal statehood 
depends more on coercion and less on hegemonic incorporation of the 
popular classes and their interests. 
 A crucial source of neoliberalism’s strength is its global scope. 
It is based on the assumption that all countries need to follow a set of 
standard policies. Whilst starting at different points, low and mid-
income countries and OECD countries must all engage in structural 
reform to open their markets, facilitate the transformation of the state to 
serve private capital more effectively, downsize the public sector and 
open it to competition, shift the burden of social spending towards 
‘active’ measures meant to develop a more competitive workforce and 
accept that states can no longer provide solidaristic protection against 
market forces. Advocates of neoliberalism pursue a strategy of 
presenting such polices as based on international convergence which is 
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driven by ‘model countries’ and ‘best practice’. It is suggested that 
‘policy learning’ would be facilitated by the copying of models. 
However, this one-size-fits-all approach is misguided: it ignores national 
path dependency and the limited regulatory capabilities of developing 
countries thereby resulting in inappropriate policy choices (Casey and 
Dostal 2008). What is on offer, in fact, is a global competitive hierarchy 
based on winners and losers. In other words, joining the liberal open 
market system certainly does not offer any guarantees against failure. 
But not to join means to be a certain loser as all outsiders must fall 
further behind the rate of economic growth and degree of 
‘competitiveness’ of the advanced OECD countries.  
 In the neoliberal order, the strong and the weak return to their 
‘natural’ position in the global hierarchy, i.e. a global division of labour 
in which the economies of the periphery serve the needs of the core. If 
economically weak developing countries want to maintain any prospect 
of future prosperity, they need to accommodate to this natural order. 
Their demands for recognition must be based on niche strategies – the 
pursuit of competitive advantage in tightly limited areas of economic 
specialization (Gereffi 2008). Moreover, they must accept trade rules 
that are put in place by the OECD countries, thereby abandoning 
‘unreasonable’ economic nationalism. Next, they need to dismantle 
existing industrial policies and protection of domestic markets from 
external competition as they limit the attractiveness for foreign direct 
investment, which is seen as the most crucial indicator of emerging 
‘competitiveness’. 
 In sum, the less developed countries are asked to follow the 
neoliberal policies that have been introduced in Europe and North 
America since the 1980s. However, they arrive at this juncture from a 
different point of origin because state legitimacy, especially in the 
Middle East region, and in Syria in particular, has been based on a social 
contract in which states were obliged to provide for the basic economic 
needs of citizens. For example, Syrian developmental policies during the 
period of import-substituting industrialization in the 1970s included the 
construction of a modest national welfare state.ii Moreover, in 
developing countries the impact of neoliberal restructuring is potentially 
more severe. In particular, many groups live close to the poverty line 
and the middle class is less isolated from the threat of social decline. 
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Thus, many sections of society are likely to see a deterioration in their 
social status as a breach of an implicit contract between their social 
interests and state agency. In more general terms, the imposition of 
neoliberalism in developing countries also fails to recognize that 
practically all successful industrializing countries apart, from the UK as 
the first developer, have protected their infant industries behind tariff 
walls. Moreover the role of the state has continued to expand in the later 
stages of development. In sum, the neoliberal programme for developing 
countries ignores the historical track record and proclaims that past 
experience is no longer valid. 
 Moving on to the question of how the neoliberal ‘model’ of 
capitalism is disseminated, the connection between domestic and 
supranational politics has been stressed (Dostal 2004; Harvey 2006). In 
particular, coordinating institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, 
OECD and WTO act as agents of neoliberal restructuring. Their 
supranational character helps to insulate them from domestic pressures 
and interests as long as the dominant member countries support their 
normative political stance. Their role is to subject both business and 
labour to the disciplines of capitalist competitiveness. They do so by 
combining their own supranational authority with the authority of 
national states. Both sides influence each other, in particular the major 
OECD countries remain the dominant actors within supranational 
institutions in ‘deciding on their functioning, structure and conditions of 
entry, and sustaining them financially’ (Özkırımlı 2005: 134). Thus, 
when OECD governments become objects of supranational regulatory 
intervention, this is to a large extent of their own making and carefully 
controlled. Developing countries experience this intervention 
differently: supranational institutions offer advice with little scope for 
tailoring it to the needs of the individual state. Indeed, the stability of the 
neoliberal normative framework depends on its apparent universality. 
The neoliberal transformation of domestic capitalism requires the 
acceptance of ‘objective’ external pressures that enforce adaptation in 
order to prosper in economic competition with other countries. It has 
been pointed out that: 
the political economy of global competitiveness is simultaneous-
ly systemic and state-centered…. It is for that reason both that 
the state is central, and that the logic must operate at a global 
level if it is to be effective at the national level (Cammack 2006: 
4-5, emphasis in the original). 
 What is new here is that the member states of the EU and other 
OECD countries accept not only responsibility for their own domestic 
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neoliberal reform but insist that all states have to join and that the 
project is now genuinely global in scale. In institutional terms, the less 
developed countries are asked to join existing and new supranational 
institutions such as the recently founded ‘International Competition 
Network’ to ‘lock in’ domestic market liberalisation and to force an 
opening of their economies for competitive pressures deriving from the 
advanced countries. 
 In this context, the politics of trade liberalisation is of particular 
strategic importance because it puts sustained pressure on developing 
countries to engage in business-oriented domestic reform. By adapting 
to external pressures, governing elites in developing countries are 
empowered to develop their own ‘competitiveness’, often at the cost of 
abandoning existing social agreements with their domestic political 
power base. Domestic economic liberalisation therefore is facilitated 
because political decision-making has been predetermined by norms and 
values that derive from the advanced countries as represented by 
supranational organisations, international financial institutions and 
regional free trade areas such as the EU and NAFTA. The next section 
analyses the EU’s efforts in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP) 
(since 1995) and the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) (since 
2003) to facilitate the transition of neighbouring North African and Arab 
countries towards market liberalisation and increased adaptation and 
integration with the EU’s neoliberal model.  
The EU and its neighbours: the uneven and combined spread of 
market and trade liberalisation 
The capitalist world economy is dominated by three major economic 
blocs (EU, NAFTA and Japan/South-East Asia) that have been built 
around regional free trade agreements and increasingly deep economic 
and trade integration between the three blocs (Dicken 2007: 106-36). In 
the 1980s, European debates focused on the question of whether the EC 
should put forward an industrial policy using the common external tariff 
of the EC to protect industrial producers in a similar way as had been 
done earlier in the case of EC agriculture. However, this scenario lost 
out against the alternative of increasing openness between the main 
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trading blocs thereby allowing deeper integration between different 
economic blocs (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989).  
 At present, the debate seems to favour a global orientation 
although the regular conflict over issues of trade liberalisation between 
the major blocs in venues such as the WTO suggests that this strategic 
decision might again be challenged at some future point. The strength of 
neoliberal ideas within supranational organisations and in EU 
institutions is based on the dominance of factions of capital that believe 
that a transnational and global orientation will deliver them economic 
gain and that the costs of adaptation will be worth paying to sustain 
regional competitiveness in the global system. The EU has therefore 
shifted from a potential venue of re-regulation of the pressures of 
globalisation towards the role of embracing and diffusing the 
imperatives of neoliberal restructuring (Bieler 2006: ch. 2).  
 These shifts at the European level have moved in parallel with 
attempts to deliver liberalised trade relations at the global level. In this 
context, the transition from the General Agreement on Trades and 
Tariffs (GATT), which had governed global trade since 1947, to the 
World Trade Organisation in 1995 was significant as was the more 
recent effort to create an integrated system of global economic 
governance based on a network of World Bank, IMF and WTO. 
Nevertheless, these developments must not be understood as a historical 
breakthrough of trade liberalisation in comparison with earlier periods. 
In his seminal study of GATT and WTO, Wilkinson has argued that: 
the WTO is not about free trade; nor has it, or the GATT, ever 
been…. It is about facilitating and entrenching in international 
law political bargains that enable the economic agents of partici-
pating governments to pursue opportunities in some markets 
while protecting others (2006: 17). 
 The same author stresses that global trade relationships are 
based on asymmetry, which favours the advanced OECD countries in 
focusing on industrial and service liberalisation and the protection of 
intellectual property rights. In particular, international agencies such as 
the ‘World Intellectual Property Association’, which cooperates with the 
WTO, aim to enforce OECD countries’ technological rents deriving 
from intellectual property. What this policy fails to appreciate is that 
today’s OECD countries historically have all ignored intellectual 
property rights at one point or another in the past. In fact, the ability to 
copy the most successful technologies of their time was of crucial 
importance in helping them to speed up their own economic 
development (Wade 2003; Naylor 2007).  
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 On the other hand, the primary, agricultural and textile 
producing countries have had little influence on the agenda of trade 
negotiations since various barriers such as quantitative restrictions and 
the protection of OECD agricultural producers from competition have 
historically limited their access to OECD markets. According to 
Wilkinson, the result has been the emergence of a set of international 
and regional organisations that is ‘organised into a multi-layered system 
of economic governance that further locks in the [trade] asymmetries in 
the WTO’s legal framework’ (2006: 99). The current Doha 
Development Round of global trade negotiations is set to continue this 
pattern as OECD countries will gain more from further liberalisation of 
trade in services, protection of intellectual property and in non-
agricultural market access than developing countries will gain from a 
moderate liberalisation in market access for agriculture (ibid.: 139). 
 From the point of view of its advocates, the major advantage of 
a politics of trade liberalisation is the modular nature of the strategy. It 
allows for the emergence of a shared normative framework over time 
but accepts that progress will be negotiated incrementally and that the 
most powerful countries will continue to exercise their veto power in the 
process (Hudson 2003: ch. 9). Nevertheless, the scope of economic 
reform and trade liberalisation is wide-ranging: 
The ultimate objective is the removal of a wide spectrum of non-
tariff barriers that obstruct economic transactions and resource 
flows across borders…. The focus [is] on a tailor-made type of 
“regulatory convergence”…. What is primarily needed are deci-
sive domestic reforms that enhance productivity, improve the 
general business climate, and remove non-tariff barriers (Müller-
Jentsch 2005: 79). 
  
In this context, the EU’s Mediterranean policies such as the EMP 
and ENP form part of a larger strategy of opening up developing 
countries for the agenda of global competitiveness: 
While it [the EMP/ENP] formulates a “grand vision” for the re-
gion, it can be implemented incrementally and at multiple 
speeds…. [D]eeper integration may be tackled at different policy 
levels (national reforms, regional integration, multilateral liberal-
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ization) and in a wide range of policy areas (individual sectors 
and themes)… While the long-term goal is clear, there are many 
ways of getting there (ibid.). 
Thus, the EMP/ENP policies serve a broad variety of purpos-
es, ranging from the geopolitical to the economic. At first glance, 
they might appear to compete with parallel geopolitical initiatives for 
the region implemented by the United States. Nevertheless, they also 
often share US concerns and positions as will be demonstrated later 
on in the case study of the relationship between the EU and Syria.  
 Observers of the history of the relationship between the EC/EU 
and Mediterranean countries have pointed to a ‘high birth rate’ and ‘high 
death rate’ of European political initiatives in the region (Aliboni 2001). 
Table 1 below outlines the seven major initiatives between 1972 and the 
present and briefly sketches the policy content of each initiative. 
Table 1: Major EC/EU policy initiatives towards Mediterranean 
countries since 1972 
Year Title of policy 
initiative 
Policy content 
1972 Global Mediterra-
nean Policy (GMP) 
Bilateral economic cooperation agreements and eco-
nomic and financial aid in the form of bilateral financial 
protocols 
1973 Euro-Arab Dia-
logue 
Promotion of economic and cultural ties 
1990 Renovated Medi-
terranean Policy 
(RMP) 
Continuation of GMP, increased aid, additional empha-
sis on human rights 
1992 Euro-Maghreb 
Partnership 
Shift from development co-operation to political dia-
logue 
1995 Euro-
Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) 
‘Barcelona process’ 
Establishment of a free-trade area by 2010, bilateral 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
2003 European Neigh-
bourhood Policy 
(ENP) 
‘European Neighbourhood Action Plans’, focus on polit-
ical dialogue and economic reform, trade liberalisation, 
energy, security, human rights through ‘European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instruments’ 
2008 Mediterranean 
Union 
Announced to give new élan to the Barcelona process, 
focusing on new development projects and led by a 
new dual Directorship consisting of one representative 
each from EU and Mediterranean countries appointed 
for two years 
Sources: Aliboni 2001; Baracani 2005; European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 2007, Le Monde 2008. 
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 The first generation of policies in the 1970s was based on 
cooperation agreements that granted Mediterranean countries 
preferential access to European markets for some of their agricultural 
products. The current second generation policy of signing individual 
‘Association Agreements’ between the EU and the MENA (Middle East 
and North African) countries emerged in reaction to developments that 
were largely external. In particular, the completion of the EC’s Common 
European Market programme in 1992 and the setting-up of the EU in the 
same year was followed by the process of EU Eastern enlargement. This 
process granted EU membership to Central and East European countries 
and two Mediterranean states (Malta and Cyprus) in 2004 and 2007, 
respectively. The new EU member states now qualify for preferential 
treatment under the rules of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. 
Subsequently, many MENA agricultural exports to the EU faced 
increased competition as a result of this enlargement.  
 To some extent the Barcelona process after 1995 – a second 
generation EU Mediterranean policy – served to balance the 
commitment of the EU to Eastern enlargement with the requirement to 
engage with the MENA countries. The Barcelona process linked 
differentiated access to the EU market with differentiated convergence: 
rising degrees of convergence could be rewarded with closer association 
deals and financial assistance. This situation was made more 
complicated by the re-launch of the Barcelona process as European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2003 and most recently, the launch of the 
‘Mediterranean Union’ in March 2008. Under these, EU neighbours are 
divided into prospective candidates for membership and the MENA 
countries which will not gain admission but might qualify for the 
establishment of a new tier of institutions for which the term ‘European 
Partnership Area’ has been suggested (Bechev and Nicolaidis 2008: 3).iii 
 The EU’s current policy towards MENA countries focuses on 
the signing of bilateral economic Association Agreements with each 
Mediterranean partner country. These Agreements commit the EU and 
MENA countries to the incremental abolition of tariffs and the mutual 
granting of full market access, subject to certain qualifications, after a 
transition period. The explicit goal is the economic integration of the 
MENA countries with the EU and the world economy in a dual process. 
On the one hand, the MENA countries are encouraged to gain privileged 
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access to the EU regional trade bloc and must open their own markets to 
goods originating in the EU. On the other hand, signing the Agreement 
with the EU commits MENA countries to the existing global trade 
regime to whose rules and regulations on trade in goods, services and 
protection of intellectual property rights the bilateral Agreements refer 
frequently.iv Thus, both regimes mutually reinforce each other and the 
EU works in this context as the agent of the global trade regime. 
 Returning to the situation in the mid-1990s, MENA states 
reacted to the globalization of neo-liberalism by advancing domestic and 
regional liberal economic reforms. At the domestic level, new regulatory 
rules were adopted to restructure the banking and financial sector and to 
advance tax and customs systems in tune with policies of trade 
liberalisation. At the regional level, MENA states started to engage each 
other in regional South-South free trade agreements, such as the Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and the Mediterranean Arab Free Trade 
Agreement (MAFTA).v The former was formally agreed in 1997 under 
the auspices of the Arab League and came into existence on 1 January 
2005. The latter is the outcome of the parallel Agadir process which led 
to the establishment of the MAFTA in 2004 (United Nations 2001: v-vi; 
Wippel 2005).  
 The potential for this MENA regionalism to mitigate the effects 
of the core-periphery structure of the neo-liberal global economy 
remains, however, uncertain. First, earlier initiatives for regional trade 
liberalisation in the MENA countries since the 1970s collapsed. Second, 
the MENA countries tend to produce similar commodities and all suffer 
from a narrow industrial base. This limits their potential for regionally 
integrated production chains and mutual South-South trade. Third, all 
major MENA countries share in common the view that the EU provides 
the main market for their exports. This might work to limit the potential 
of the MENA countries to extract meaningful trade concessions from the 
EU, thereby making EU-MENA trade liberalisation even more 
asymmetrical.vi This feature has been reinforced by the EU’s decision to 
negotiate Association Agreements individually with each Mediterranean 
and Arab country rather than to take account of regional initiatives such 
as GAFTA and MAFTA. Fourth, the MENA countries have different 
regional interests and geopolitical concerns. Trade between MENA 
countries is limited in comparison with each country’s trade with the EU 
but MENA countries often have privileged relationships with regions 
beyond the scope of the EU and of GAFTA and MAFTA. And both 
regional free trade agreements are linked to the global level through 
frequent reference to WTO regulations in their documents.  
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 Lastly, it must be observed that political commitment to the 
large-scale liberalisation of access of EU and OECD countries to MENA 
markets has not yet been tested. The potential of increased EU exports to 
trigger deterioration in Arab state budgets and local labour markets is 
only beginning to become visible (Wippel 2005: 7). There is agreement 
in the literature that the elimination of tariffs and barriers for EU 
industrial goods (and possibly services) will threaten MENA small and 
medium-sized businesses. Moreover, large-scale liberalisation of trade 
in agriculture would trigger increased migration from the countryside 
and social dislocation in rural areas (Asseburg 2005: 4). In sum, the 
liberalisation of trade at both the regional and global level is likely to 
remain contested.  
The case of the EU-Syria Association Agreement 
In this section, the Syrian Arab Republic is selected as a case study in 
order to examine the encounter of the neoliberal model with a relative 
outsider in the capitalist world economy. Syria has represented pan-Arab 
nationalist aspirations for more than three decades; it has focused its 
resources on constructing a national security state to balance its regional 
opponent Israel and has historically been largely self-sufficient in core 
economic fields such as agricultural production and energy supplies. 
The analysis of Syria, governed for more than four decades by the Arab 
Socialist Baath Party, is therefore a critical case to examine the universal 
strength or otherwise of neoliberal globalisation. 
 Since the Barcelona process in 1995, the EU has signed 
bilateral agreements with all MENA partner countries except Syria and 
all but one of the Agreements subsequently have been fully ratified. The 
negotiation process between the EU and Syria started in 1998 as the last 
of all bilateral deliberations. An agreement was first approved on a 
technical level in December 2003 and then ‘initialled’ by the chief 
negotiators in October 2004 (Directorate General for Trade 2003; 
EuropaWorld 2004). In June 2005, the Head of the European parliament 
delegation to Syria declared that signing could be expected before the 
10th anniversary of the Barcelona process in November of the same 
year (Business Newsletter 2005).  
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 However, no ratification has been forthcoming and the 
Agreement has subsequently become a permanent political bargaining 
chip between the EU and Syria. Disagreement has focused at various 
points since 2004 on the Lebanon crisis and the 2006 Israeli military 
campaign, demands for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the issue of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as regards Syria’s 
chemically armed missile force, human rights and other issues 
(Hinnebusch 2005: 9). However, what has been decisive for the 
blocking of the Agreement was a change in French policy after the 
murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri on 14 February 
2004. Some observers have also pointed to additional economic factors 
in explaining the shift in the French position, notably failed negotiations 
between Syria and France about oil and trade deals in October 2004 
(Crisis Group 2005: 26). Yet the Hariri case marked a clear turning point 
towards a degree of realignment between the US and the EU on the 
Syrian issue – regardless of Syria’s subsequent withdrawal from 
Lebanon and continuing Syrian steps towards liberal economic reform. 
In particular, both the US and EU supported the international inquiry 
into the Hariri murder and European discourse has subsequently stressed 
that the outcome of the inquiry is ‘a decisive factor in the signing and 
ratification of the association agreement’ (Committee on Foreign Affairs 
2006, emphasis added).vii  
 Moreover, since 2004, the European side has put forward long 
lists of demands to the Syrian representatives that mix political and 
economic issues. What is crucial is that the EU has insisted that Syrian 
economic concessions will not result in a turning down of the EU’s 
additional political demands. On the Syrian government’s side, this 
European posture – especially once Syria had met the first part of UN 
Resolution 1559 to withdraw from Lebanon only to be pushed on the 
second part of the Resolution which requires Syria to cooperate in the 
disarmament of the Hezbollah militia – has been met with increasing 
scepticism. A European diplomat is quoted saying that ‘Syrians have 
come to think that it’s a game and ask what the next condition will be’ 
(Wieland 2006: 153). In the spring of 2005, the Syrian side started to 
feel that concessions only resulted in additional demands and that the 
negotiations failed to deliver. However, both sides continue to refer 
regularly to the need to sign the Agreement when the time is right, and 
the Syrian government has started to implement many of the economic 
commitments entailed in the Agreement. Syria has received some 
assistance in modernizing its domestic economic governance from 
Germany, thereby creating pilot projects for more large-scale 
cooperation at a future point. Most important, the French government 
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invited the Syrian government to attend the founding conference of the 
Mediterranean Union on 13 July 2008 in Paris. According to French 
President Sarkozy, the Association Agreement should re-enter the 
agenda and should be ratified at some as yet unspecified point (Seale 
2008). 
 In comparison to the political bargaining process, the actual 
content of the Agreement itself has received less attention. Yet the 
agreement deserves analysis as its content, if enacted, would lead to a 
fundamental change in the way in which the Syrian economic system 
actually works. The 2004 draft Agreement between the EU and Syria 
contains 77 pages and 433 pages of Annexes and Protocols. Its general 
focus is on the gradual abolition of tariffs between Syria and the EU 
over a 12-year period and the progressive establishment of a free-trade 
area.viii The Agreement’s economic provisions on customs duties, right 
of establishment for companies, rules on competition, the settling of 
disputes in bilateral trade and the opening up of Syrian government 
procurement for EU exports are more wide-ranging than is the case in 
the other Agreements (Zorob 2007a: 20-3, 2008: 9-10). Moreover, it 
contains political provisions not usually found in bilateral trade 
agreements such as the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and cooperation on counter-terrorism.ix  
 The key provision is that ‘Syria will liberalise its imports 
regime for Community products so that all tariffs are reduced to zero by 
the end of the twelve year transition period after entry into force of the 
Agreement’ (European Commission 2004a: 3). Each side to the 
Agreement must also grant companies of the other side treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to domestic companies (Article 43).x Syria 
must be prepared to open ‘almost all sectors for [EU] investment’ (ibid.: 
3) and must allow companies originating in the Community to move 
their capital freely in and out of Syria (Article 62). Furthermore, Syria 
must engage in ‘appropriate economic restructuring’ and offer an 
‘appropriate framework for political dialogue’ to allow for the 
‘progressive liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital’ (ibid.: 
13 and Article 1). This commitment includes the incremental abolition 
of customs duties and, more urgently, abolition of ‘all import and export 
prohibitions…upon entry into force of this [Association] Agreement’ 
(Article 23). The introduction of new customs duties or non-tariff 
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barriers is forbidden (Article 9 and 10). Furthermore, Syria must commit 
to adjust ‘State monopolies of a commercial character’ and public 
enterprises to abolish by the end of the fifth year after signing of the 
Agreement any discrimination in government procurement between EU 
and Syrian national companies (Article 65 and 66). It must also enforce 
the protection of intellectual property rights ‘in accordance with the 
highest international standards’, which includes the rules of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) (Article 72). 
 These core provisions are qualified on a number of counts. To 
begin with, any political obligation for consultation during the reform 
process is limited to ‘consultation mechanisms between administrations 
and the business community’ and is required to ‘meet the needs of the 
trading community’ (Article 39). In particular, the Agreement aims to 
create an environment favourable to the development of private 
enterprise and a stable environment for investment (Article 98). The 
Agreement also includes some general statements about social co-
operation and improvement of living conditions (Article 110). Yet it 
does not commit to social dialogue or consultation with trade unions or 
civil society. 
 As far as the crucial question of protection of Syrian companies 
from EU competition is concerned, the Agreement limits any scope for 
protective measures. The Syrian authorities are granted the power to 
increase or reintroduce customs duties during the transition period to 
protect ‘infant industries’ or sectors whose restructuring produces major 
social problems (Article 15).xi However, this right is heavily qualified in 
terms of scope and duration. It covers only 20 per cent of the total yearly 
average value of imports of industrial goods originating from the EU 
and cannot exceed the duration of five years. All details must be 
mutually agreed between the EU and Syria in the ‘Association 
Committee’, the bilateral EU-Syrian body provided for in the 
Agreement to manage the association process. Moreover, Syria must 
offer ‘a timetable for the elimination of the customs duties introduced 
under this Article…. The Association Committee may decide on a 
different timetable’ (ibid.). In sum, the ability of Syria to put forward 
unilateral protective measures is severely limited in scope and might be 
subject to sanctions under the provisions of the Agreement. 
 Another potentially important section of the Agreement 
concerns those economic sectors that are excluded from the scope of 
Article 43 on non-discrimination between EU and Syrian companies. 
This article, already referred to above, grants EU, Syrian and third 
country companies ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status and allows non-
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discriminatory access to each market. Crucially, the application of this 
paragraph excludes those Syrian economic sectors that are subject to 
Syrian government monopoly (the list of these sectors in Annex IV of 
the draft Agreement is left blank). Furthermore, some other economic 
activities that are not subject to government monopoly still qualify for 
various degrees of protection from the scope of Article 43. This list of 
economic activities, also to be found in Annex IV of the draft 
Agreement, is fairly extensive and covers telecommunications, domestic 
banking and education services, amongst others. However, the stipulated 
limits on EU and foreign capital are in most cases rather modest. They 
mostly concern a guaranteed share of 25 per cent for Syrian investment 
capital and ownership. The sector of telecommunications is singled out 
for a more rapid opening to competition during a transitional period of 
only six years from entry into force of the Agreement.xii Other 
potentially important provisions concern banks whose ownership is 
subject to a minimum of 51 per cent Syrian ownership and some 
provisions governing nationality requirements of employees in the 
education sector. Overall, the Agreement puts much higher demands on 
the Syrian side than is the case for all other Mediterranean states that 
have already signed their respective Agreements with the EU.  
The political-economy context of the EU-Syrian Association 
Agreement.  
The Association agreement has to be understood in the wider context of 
Syria’s development strategies and dilemmas. Observers of Syria have 
generally stressed the dominance of geopolitical concerns in policy-
making by the country’s leadership. The economic base of the regime 
was in comparative terms less important than the positioning of Syria in 
the regional system by building up the Syrian national security state in 
order to balance Israel. After 1970, Syria pursued a policy of external 
reliance on the Soviet Union that was supplemented by a strategic 
security partnership with Iran after the Iranian revolution of 1979. After 
1991, Syria lost its Soviet backing but re-established a new political 
relationship with Putin’s Russia, especially after Russia agreed a 
cancellation of Syria’s bilateral debt in 2005. In addition, the last stage 
of Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq was characterised by a tactical 
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rapprochement between the two countries and Syria was able to rely for 
some years on oil deliveries from Iraq which helped to free some of 
Syria’s own oil production for export. Meanwhile, Syria attempted to 
improve the bilateral relationship with the United States, especially after 
its support of US action against neighbouring Iraq after the latter’s 
occupation of Kuwait, but this did not fully bear fruit, and collapsed 
after the Clinton Administration’s failure to deliver on the Middle East 
‘peace process’. Since 2003, the US strategy of blocking Syria’s 
aspiration to join the WTO and using sanctions to isolate the country’s 
business community has slowed Syria’s economic reform efforts. 
 After the transition of power from Hafiz al-Asad to Bashar al-
Asad, following the former’s death in office on 10 June 2000, major 
shifts in economic policy were avoided. From 2003 onwards, however, 
the economic reform programme turned towards liberalisation. In 
particular, the Syrian leadership started to focus on pursuing the option 
of an Association Agreement with the EU as a matter of urgency. At this 
time, this signalled a genuine shift in the government’s strategy for 
geopolitical reasons. In particular, it was held to counter the US strategy 
of isolating Syria in the region after the 2003 occupation of Iraq. The 
gravity of the threat from the US might also explain why the Syrian 
government offered to include services in the list of sectors to be 
liberalised as a way to speed up the signing of the Agreement (Haddad 
2005: 17). As it turned out, the EU was not willing to go forward with 
the Agreement at that point.  
 Since then, Syria has sought to increase its economic and 
strategic ties with Russia, Iran and China (Hinnebusch 2005: 11). 
However, Syria’s strategic alliance with Iran lacks the crucial economic 
dimension. Although it is emerging as a regional power, Iran is 
nevertheless economically not strong enough to act as anchor of 
economic reform in Syria. Iranian offers to support the construction of 
new oil refineries in Syria lack plausibility as Iran itself suffers from a 
major shortfall in domestic refinery capacity (Spiegel 2007). Syria has 
also made efforts to attract new foreign direct investment from the GCC 
states and Turkey. Turkish businesses in Syria have been able to 
produce for export within the GAFTA regional trade agreement, thereby 
encouraging South-South integration. The states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council have invested in large projects in Syria owing to the sharp rise 
in their revenue from the current second oil boom (Hertog 2007). One 
can expect that Syrian ‘venue shopping’, i.e. the attempt to negotiate 
with external powers to facilitate domestic economic development, will 
continue to form part of the country’s strategy for the foreseeable future, 
especially as opportunities appear to improve again from the low point 
22    Syria and the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship 
 
in 2004 due to the current failure of US policy-making in the region. Yet 
these options do not serve as a full-scale alternative to economic 
liberalization. On the contrary, at least the relationship with Arab 
investors might be dependent on further economic liberalization, as does 
the EU option. 
 Moving from the geopolitical to the domestic level, it must be 
stressed that the Syrian government originally relied for its political 
support on a coalition, which consisted of popular constituencies such as 
small and medium peasants, unionised workers, public sector employees 
and the civil and military state institutions. On the other hand, until 
1970, the rule of the Bath party largely excluded the old bourgeoisie 
from access to the state. Thus, a potential ‘triple alliance’ (Hinnebusch 
1997) of state, domestic and international capital did not emerge. The 
stability of the system relied on rents from the oil sector emerging after 
1973, which allowed in turn for the build-up of a public sector that 
served to stabilise the ruling social coalition (Seale 1995: 317-8, 451-3). 
It also allowed for the establishment of some features of a welfare state 
based on free access to education and health care and subsidised staple 
foods. In the mid-1980s, major trade and budget imbalances emerged 
and the Syrian government engaged in some limited liberalisation 
(infitah) which cut public spending and included a new investment law 
(Law No. 10 of 1991) to encourage foreign and expatriate investors and 
the richer Arab states to invest in the Syrian economy.xiii However, the 
law was subsequently not backed up by a more comprehensive reform 
programme and Nabil Sukkar, a liberal opinion leader within the Syrian 
elite, described the 1990s as a ‘lost decade’ (Perthes 2004: 28; Syria 
Today 2005).  
 The Syrian economy suffers from at least three major problems 
which have put sustained pressure on the regime to undertake reform. 
First, economic rents from oil are declining and it is expected that Syria 
will become a net-importer of oil around 2012. This questions the 
sustainability of the Syrian welfare state and the very economic 
foundation of the public sector and of state-owned enterprises. Second, 
Syrian demographic development is characterised by rapid population 
growth and a very low average age of population – the so-called ‘youth 
bulge’ – which increases demands for employment at a time of 
decreasing economic rents from oil, thereby no longer allowing for 
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expansion of public sector employment. Third, external political support 
for Syria has declined and the strategic security partnership with Iran has 
so far only a limited economic dimension. According to one observer, 
these features appear to constitute a ‘textbook example of the nexus of 
demographic expansion and poor macroeconomic performance’ 
(Leverett 2005: 34). Another analyst suggests that it is only a matter of 
time until the Syrian government will be forced by structural constraints 
to shift its social support base away from the public sector and 
agricultural interests and towards an alliance with private and 
international capital (Haddad 2005). Such a development would enable 
the realisation of Hinnebusch’s ‘triple alliance’ and would point to the 
Syrian government’s acceptance of the global competitiveness agenda. 
How likely is this development to come about under the leadership of 
President Bashar al-Asad? 
 In order to analyse the degree of change in economic policy-
making under Bashar al-Asad, one first needs to summarise some facts 
about the Syrian economy he inherited. The basic point is that the Syrian 
economy has been a mixed economy with state control and state 
monopolies in some strategic sectors such as electricity, water, 
telecommunications and, most importantly, oil and gas (Sukkar 2006: 
5). Moreover, the public sector includes some other strategic sectors 
such as cement production, sugar refining, fertilizers and a dominant 
position in insurance and banking (World Bank 2005b: vii). The state 
also subsidises inputs in agriculture and purchases domestic agricultural 
crops at above world market prices. This is an important policy as the 
agricultural sector – a core constituency of the social coalition led by the 
Baath party – still constitutes 21 per cent of overall employment while 
industry makes up 26 per cent and services account for 52 per cent (DG 
Trade 2007). In addition, the state subsidizes water, electricity and fuel 
and exercises exclusive control of the procurement and sale of cotton 
and wheat while state-owned enterprises enjoy different levels of 
subsidy and protection (DG Economic and Financial Affairs 2005: 132). 
Another important public sector instrument is state-controlled credit 
provision and loans to the private sector have until recently remained a 
small fraction of overall lending (European Commission 2007c: 10).xiv  
 The Syrian public sector’s share of GDP has nevertheless 
declined since the 1980s and the private sector now accounts for an 
estimated 65 per cent of GDP and employs almost 75 per cent of the 
civilian workforce (IMF 2005: 15; Perthes 2004: 28-31).xv The public 
and private sectors coexist in a balance that is conditional on the ability 
of the state to procure sufficient resources from the oil and gas sector to 
sustain public sector employment. Conversely, the Syrian state’s 
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revenue from taxing the private sector is low and it is estimated that only 
half of private income is reported for tax purposes. Moreover, the non-
oil tax revenue is only slightly above 10 per cent of GDP which is low 
by regional standards (World Bank 2005b: viii; IMF 2006a: 31; 
European Commission 2007c: 9). The state employs 300,000 workers in 
state-owned enterprises and 900,000 civil servants (ibid.).xvi In regional 
terms, the former figure is fairly low and represents 7 per cent of all 
employees while the civil service, accounting for 21 per cent, is an 
employer of last employment of resort with low productivity and low 
wages thereby limiting open unemployment (Sukkar 2006: 3-4). 
 In the period of increasing oil rents after 1973, the Syrian state 
expanded the public sector and state enterprises through a policy of 
obligatory recruitment of all graduates from advanced schools and 
universities. This policy was attractive for graduates as employment in 
the public sector offered a life-long job guarantee and some health, 
housing and pension benefits not obtainable in the private sector. In 
2003, 75 per cent of the total active population with a higher education 
degree was employed in the public sector. According to two Syrian 
statistical sources, the 2003 Labour Force Survey and the 2003 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey, the public sector accounted 
for 24 per cent of the total civil labour force while the formal private 
sector provided 35 per cent and the informal private sector 37 of overall 
employment although the second survey suggested higher figures for the 
formal private sector and lower figures for the informal one (European 
Training Foundation 2006: 23-5; El Laithy and Abu-Ismail 2005: 48).xvii 
 The dynamics of the Syrian labour market are driven by the past 
build-up of the public sector and complimentary social policies that 
favour lifelong employment. The Syrian welfare state provides some 
measure of social protection in the event of death, illness, disability, 
work injury and old age but does not offer health insurance or 
unemployment benefits. Existing legislation also provides full job 
security for public sector workers and near job security for workers in 
the formal private sector (Sukkar 2006: 2). Due to this emphasis on 
employment security, Syrian unemployment is heavily concentrated in 
the cohort of young people between 15 and 24 years who struggle to 
enter the labour market and make up 80 per cent of the unemployed 
(European Training Foundation 2006: 6; Sukkar 2006: 46). The 
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demographic pressures on the labour market are set to continue as 40 per 
cent of the Syrian population are below the age of 15 (DG Economic 
and Financial Affairs 2005: 132).  
 As far as employment is concerned, the Syrian labour market 
provides a surprisingly high degree of wage compression: wage 
differentials between people with different levels of educational 
attainment are narrow and official statistics hold that university 
graduates earn only twice as much as illiterate workers (European 
Training Foundation 2006: 36). Nevertheless, the significance of this 
finding is limited as large numbers of workers in the public and private 
sector hold more than one job and the actual wage differentials might be 
much higher once this factor is taken into account. Moreover, since 
educational attainment is used by public and private sector employers to 
select employees, the informal sector is in practice often the only 
employment option for poor and illiterate workers (El Laithy and Abu-
Ismail 2005: 2, 49). In summary, the implementation of neo-liberal 
policies in Syria under an EU partnership agreement implies a radical 
transformation in current socio-economic practices.  
Syria’s Turn to the Market and the Association Agreement:  
To understand, Syria’s current moves toward economic liberalization 
and the partnership agreement, one needs to analyse how the domestic 
and international planes interact in the Syrian debate.  
 From the domestic point of view, the Syrian government 
historically had no preference for liberalisation measures as its social 
support base was dependent on the state sector. Nevertheless, the 
projected decline in Syrian oil revenue may leave ‘no long-term solution 
except a sustained take-off of private investment which depends on 
Syria’s conformity to the standards of the global market’ (Hinnebusch 
2003: 196). This holds true even if ‘opportunities and benefits of change 
remain uncertain, the risks are high and short-term alternatives exist’ 
(ibid.).  
 There is large-scale debate in Syria on the issue of economic 
liberalisation. Advocates of liberal reform have demanded a full-scale 
strategic shift of the state in favour of a newly emerging class of Syrian 
entrepreneurs. According to Nabil Sukkar, ‘the best policy for Syria 
would be to encourage the emergence of a genuine new private-
enterprise sector. This means that the government should let 
entrepreneurs, whether Syrian or foreign … invest, produce, buy and 
sell, and thus create a genuine market-based economy’ (quoted in 
Leverett 2005: 73). On the other hand, the Head of the Syrian Planning 
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Commission has warned against policy decisions that question the 
employment guarantee for older workers stating that ‘my only red line is 
that we cannot layoff anyone’ (Raddawi 2007). Not all sections of 
business, notably those dependent on state patronage, are fully 
supportive of the new course. Yet there is a clear overall shift in favour 
of the advocates of liberal reform, especially in the period after 2004 and 
in contrast to earlier waves of economic reform in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the Syrian government shows a higher degree of commitment and the 
severity of reform measures is more pronounced. Indeed, Syrian 
domestic liberal reform measures – independent from the issue of the 
Association Agreement – have become so comprehensive that a cascade 
of change appears to have started. Crucially, groups linked to the 
government have become associated with new private business projects 
while the voices of Syrian labor are largely absent from the official 
debate. This points to a change in the social support base of the regime.  
 Table 2 below outlines some of the reform measures that have 
been adopted and have been implemented to various degrees under the 
Presidency of Bashar al-Assad. These measures can be divided into 
those that favour economic liberalisation, those that are in effect 
countervailing measures and those that work to delay the economic 
reform process. Overall, the liberalisation measures are very substantial 
and, even if implementation remains limited, suggest that the 
government has committed to a liberal economic reform programme that 
is without precedent in the history of modern Syria. 
To begin with, most core measures such as the decrease in customs 
duties, simplified corporate taxation and the unification of the exchange 
rate of the Syrian lira, which is now set at market rate and pegged to a 
currency basket of Dollar, Euro and Yen, aim to facilitate trade 
liberalisation. These core measures will have a major influence on trade 
patterns between Syria and its trading partners and will pose a challenge 
to the state’s steering of the economy in sectors in which increased 
competition might threaten domestic suppliers. The strong impact of the 
measures is clear to see. For example the cut in Syrian import taxes for 
cars has resulted in a 60 per cent increase in the number of registered 
private cars since 2003 (Syria Today 2007a). Some other measures such 
as the opening of banking and insurance for private competition has also 
had a major impact, although the low level of available credit for the 
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private sector is still held to constitute a problem which limits the 
growth potential of private companies (European Commission 2007c: 
10). However, the most recent data points towards a strong rise in the 
share of private banks’ lending to the private sector (IMF 2007a: 5, 
2007b: 34). 
By contrast, it appears appropriate to describe the government’s 
countervailing measures as side payments without major strategic 
significance. The three main measures of wage increases for the public 
sector, additional public sector job creation and the reintroduction of 
industrial quotas to protect domestic suppliers all buy time but do not 
challenge the underlying trend of liberalisation. Moreover, the setting-up 
of new industrial projects backed by Syria’s allies such as the Syrian-
Iranian car manufacturing plants or new oil refineries have not yet taken 
off and their future significance for the Syrian economy is still 
unclear.xviii 
 More important and most likely to challenge the political 
commitment towards further liberalisation of the economy are gaps and 
delays in other policy areas that would have to be filled to sustain major 
economic restructuring of the public sector. On the one hand, the 
introduction of new layers of formal social security such as 
compensation for job losses and retraining has not featured highly. On 
the other hand, cuts in existing state subsidies for basic goods, especially 
the petroleum price subsidy, have proceeded slowly (IMF 2006a: 20-3). 
The need to abolish such general subsidies has been stressed by the 
international financial institutions like the IMF and the assumption of 
future Syrian energy shortages is crucial for Syrian reformers in order to 
present the reform process as the only available choice. What the IMF 
downplays, however, is that the subsidies form a crucial part of Syrian 
household income. Some of the assumptions about poor targeting of 
subsidies, such as the claim that the richest groups ‘cream off’ most of 
them, appear overstated and are not based on convincing data. 
Moreover, their phasing out has not been complemented by a broader 
shift to a means-tested system of social expenditure, as the Syrian state 
might not be ready to shift towards such an administratively more 
complex system. 
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Table 2: Selected Syrian economic reform measures between 2000 and 
2008 
 
Liberal Economic Reform Measures Countervailing 
Measures 
Delayed 
Measures 
(1) Decrease in customs duties (maximum 
rate reduced from 255 per cent to 65 per 
cent, cuts in the list of prohibited goods) 
(2) Simplified corporate tax system with 
reduced rates 
(3) Unification of the exchange rate of the 
Syrian Lira 
(4) Private banking allowed 
(5) Insurance sector opened for private 
companies 
(6) Monopoly of import agencies eliminated 
(7) Syria has joined GAFTA, has signed 
Free Trade Agreements with Arab states 
and Turkey and has applied for WTO 
membership since 2001 
(8) Preparation for the build-up of regulato-
ry agencies (Syrian Securities and Ex-
change Commission) and for the opening of 
Damascus-based stock market 
(9) Introduction of free/special economic 
zones and of a Syrian Investment Agency 
(10) Some cuts in domestic energy subsi-
dies (diesel oil) and phasing in of value-
added tax 
(11) New Company Law (Law No. 3 of 
2008) and new Anti-Trust Law (Law No. 7 
of 2008) issued 
(12) Licensing of private transport compa-
nies and large-scale private investment in 
tourism sector  
(13) German technical support for Syrian 
State Planning Commission and Central 
Bank  
(1) Reintroduction 
of industrial quo-
tas set by the 
Ministry of Indus-
try to protect do-
mestic suppliers 
(2) Setting-up of 
new industrial 
projects backed 
up by political 
alliances, e.g. two 
Syrian-Iranian car 
manufacturing 
plants and new oil 
refineries backed 
by Iran, Venezue-
la, Russia and 
China 
(3) Successive 
real wage in-
creases for civil 
servants and 
creation of addi-
tional employment 
in the public sec-
tor 
 
(1) Privatization 
of state-owned 
enterprises not 
discussed 
(2) Measures to 
promote exports 
weak 
(3) Introduction of 
retraining 
measures for the 
unemployed an-
nounced but not 
enacted 
(4) Number of 
investment vehi-
cles still low 
(apart from real 
estate) 
 
Sources: DG Economic and Financial Affairs 2005; IMF 2006c: 37-
8, 2007a; Landis 2008; Syria Today 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008a; 
2008b; Zorob 2007. 
 In practical terms, these gaps in policy-making might slow 
down reform at some future point, especially once interested groups 
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become more aware of how they will be affected. In particular, recent 
legislation granting public enterprises financial autonomy (Law 54 of 
1st October 2006), which would start to be implemented with the 2008 
budget, might trigger a rise in open unemployment that the authorities 
would have to address with complimentary social policies. So far, delays 
pose questions about the ability of the state to sustain the restructuring 
of the public sector. 
 Moving on to the issue of liberalisation of trade, one first needs 
to analyse existing Syrian trade patterns before moving on to the 
question of how trade liberalisation will affect the Syrian economy. The 
most striking feature in Syria’s economic dealings with the EU is the 
absolute dominance of energy exports (crude oil) in comparison with all 
other economic sectors. In 2007, Syrian energy exports to the EU 27 
were worth 2908 million Euros while the second and third major export 
items, agricultural products and textiles and clothing, amounted to 145 
million Euros and 118 million Euros respectively (DG Trade 2008). 
Overall, Syria’s export to and import from EU countries has declined 
between 2000 and 2006 (the Syrian export share to the EU 25 declined 
from 68 per cent of all exports to 32 per cent while Syrian imports from 
the EU declined from 33 per cent to 21 per cent of all imports) (DG 
Trade 2007, see also European Commission 2007d: 63-4).xix The 
structure of Syrian exports to other regions and countries differs from 
the case of the EU and from the single focus on energy. For example, 
the export of Syrian non-energy commodities to neighbouring GAFTA 
countries changes the overall profile of exports to a certain extent. 
Nevertheless, the overall picture is not encouraging if one focuses on the 
strategic role of the declining energy sector for the viability of the 
Syrian economy (IMF 2006c: 23). It also poses the question of how far 
Syrian industry is actually in a position to take advantage of any 
increased access to the European market under the association 
agreement. Moreover, looking at the Syrian trade patterns, one can 
detect that the Syrian government has to some extent succeeded in 
diversifying its trade away from reliance on the EU (compare table 3 
below).xx In particular, Syria has expanded its imports from China and 
increased its exports to neighbouring Iraq and some GAFTA countries. 
Nevertheless, the EU remains overall a major economic partner and the 
Association Agreement therefore also remains a major item on the 
agenda of Syrian trade diplomacy. 
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Table 3: Syria’s main import and export partners (2006) 
Import part-
ner 
Volume 
of trade 
(€m) 
% of 
total 
imports 
Export part-
ner 
Volume 
of trade 
(€m) 
% of 
total 
exports 
1 EU  3,186 21.0 1 EU 3,136 32.3 
2 Saudi Ara-
bia 
1,847 12.2 2 Iraq 2,661 27.4 
3 China 1,184  7.8 3 Lebanon  920  9.5 
4 Egypt  927  6.1 4 Egypt  513  5.3 
5 UAE  908  6.0 5 Saudi 
Arabia 
 462  4.8 
6 Ukraine  725  4.8 6 Kuwait  290  3.0 
7 Iran  670  4.4 7 UAE  250  2.6 
8 Lebanon  592  3.9 8 Algeria  222  2.3 
9 Iraq  549  3.6 9 Jordan  203  2.1 
10 Turkey  528  3.5 10 Libya  189  1.9 
11 Russia  527  3.5 11 USA  166  1.7 
18 USA  196  1.3 12 Turkey  135  1.4 
Source: DG Trade 2007. 
 Moving from the domestic to the international plane, a 
comparison of the EU’s discourse on Syria with the one sustained by the 
international financial institutions demonstrates that they share a great 
deal in common. At present, the IMF is suggesting various transition 
policies to the Syrian government to deal with the decline in oil revenue, 
such as the phasing out of general petroleum subsidies and the phasing 
in of a value-added tax (IMF 2007a).xxi However, the IMF’s core interest 
is the restructuring of the Syrian financial sector in order to prepare the 
country for a second phase of liberalisation in which the Syrian state 
would no longer hold the capacity to subsidise the public sector with 
soft loans. This would question the work of the quasi-governmental 
agricultural procurement agencies and would also trigger large-scale 
restructuring of the public banking sector (IMF 2006a: 34, IMF 2006b: 
20). In particular, the IMF demands that the Central Bank of Syria 
should be given a clear mandate ‘as the core institution of a market 
economy’ and should be granted autonomy in focusing on the primary 
objective to maintain price stability (IMF 2007a: 10-11). Furthermore, 
the IMF applauds the Association Agreement and holds in particular that 
it will ‘contribute to making progress towards observance of WTO rules 
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and disciplines’ (IMF 2006c: 4). As for the EU, the Agreement with 
Syria constitutes a textbook case of the bilateral enforcement of WTO 
rules. The Agreement focuses on ‘reciprocity’ and ‘no distortion’ 
principles. One-way trade preferences and legitimate scope for 
protection are no longer accepted as guiding principles for trade between 
countries at different stages of economic development. 
Conclusions: the prospects and consequences of a the EU 
association agreement  
The case of the EU’s Association Agreement with Syria is unique in a 
number of ways. Syria differs from other Arab countries due to its long-
term track record of economic self-sufficiency based on oil rents and 
autarchy in agriculture. Nor is the neo-liberal transition of the Syrian 
economy a foregone conclusion. Syria continues to ‘venue shop’ for 
access to economic resources and options outside of the neo-liberal 
West. While the internal debate in Syria about the Agreement indicates 
that the liberal reformers retain the upper hand, the use of the slogan of 
‘social market economy’ suggests that the Syrian government remains 
committed to a degree of domestic compromise on socio-economic 
issues.  
 Nor are the costs and benefits of the Association agreement for 
Syria undisputed. The agreement has been framed by neo-liberal 
economic theory originating from the World Bank and applied to Syria 
is a more uncompromising way than to other EU partner countries. It has 
been suggested that the opening of the Syrian economy might result over 
time in increased Syrian competitiveness and more rapid economic 
development. This scenario could create a Syrian ‘triple alliance’ of 
state, domestic and international capital, thereby providing an external 
anchor of domestic reform. On the other hand, Syrian domestic interests 
would have to accept that their role is cast as that of rather weak 
associates. Moreover, the current draft of the agreement would initially 
expand the options of EU companies whilst leaving Syrian producers 
exposed to superior competition. According to the Agreement, Syria 
must eliminate quotas and prohibitions on imports, reduce tariffs to zero 
after a twelve year transition period, cooperate in the enforcement of 
competition rules, agree to open many sectors of its public procurement, 
grant national treatment to other party’s goods and some services and 
apply the highest international standards of intellectual property 
protection. These measures, taken together, benefit EU companies most 
(Zorob 2006b: ch. 5, 2007a: 20-3). If enacted, they would result in 
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unbalanced trade flows, Syrian trade deficits and, in the longer run, 
Syrian external indebtedness. 
 The Agreement is designed to serve a double purpose: it assists 
global trade liberalisation, being linked with WTO rules, while also 
supporting the EU’s regional project of establishing a set of friendly, 
and dependent, neighbouring Mediterranean states. The asymmetries of 
global trade patterns will not be challenged by the EU’s attitude to 
South-South integration which does not support partially closed regional 
integration that would establish privileged relationships amongst 
southern states and allow them to retain sovereignty over the agenda and 
timetable of trade policies. However, the most basic weakness of all the 
partnership agreements is that they allow for a socially and sectorally 
disintegrated economic structure in the partner countries. They also fail 
to offer any strategy regarding capacity building of the Mediterranean 
states to deal with full-scale liberalization. If they unleash instability in 
MENA countries, they may be self-defeating. In summary, the Syrian 
case of economic liberalisation under severe structural constraints not 
merely tests the capacity of Syrian policy-makers but also highlights the 
limited contribution of the EU to stability and economic development in 
what remains the most difficult geopolitical region in the world. 
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i The ’Washington consensus’, jointly driven by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank and WTO, focuses on a standard set of liberal 
economic policies (see Jones 2006: 228-9). Recent economic debates suggest, 
however, that there is no longer a Washington consensus. For example, some 
former and current opinion leaders associated with the World Bank have 
publicly stated their disagreement with elements of the above framework. Yet 
these more recent changes in the debate, sometimes referred to as ‘post-
Washington consensus’ (Knio 2008), are not reflected in the EU’s policy advice 
for Syria.   
ii In spite of emerging basic state welfare in Syria in the 1970s, many 
Syrian workers were still forced to leave poor regions of Syria to become 
migrant workers in richer neighbouring Lebanon or other economically more 
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advanced countries. Here, they entered a highly deregulated transnational labour 
market which appears in hindsight to be an early laboratory of neoliberal 
capitalism (Chalcraft 2007). 
iii It is too early to judge if the Mediterranean Union can qualify as a new 
EU partnership policy or whether it is merely a rhetorical relaunch as part of the 
new French President’s diplomatic offensive. Tthe original French proposal 
pointed towards privileged access for all Mediterranean states, irresponsive of 
EU membership, to the new policy. This model of a new Mediterranean ‘club’ 
has been abandoned after Franco-German consultations which restored an EU 
policy open to all 27 EU member states. The current proposal leaves a new 
Secretariat (a body of two leaders, one from the EU and one from the group of 
Mediterranean partner countries) as the single institutional innovation of the 
Mediterranean Union. 
iv The Agreements are less far reaching as far as the liberalisation of trade 
in services is concerned. Most Agreements simply confirm existing 
commitments under the GATS regime. These do currently not apply to Syria 
and Lebanon who are not members of the WTO and of GATS. 
v The term MAFTA has not become established in common usage. Instead, 
most subsequent sources refer to it as ‘Agadir Agreement’. The main feature of 
the Agreement is that the four signatories use the EU’s rules of origin allowing 
them to cumulate inputs from each of the four states in their exports for the 
purpose of accessing the EU’s preferential tariff. 
vi This feature is referred to in the literature as the ‘hub-and-spokes’ 
structure in EU-MENA economic relations (Nsouli 2006). This suggests that the 
EU market (the ‘hub’) gains access to the markets of all MENA countries (the 
‘spokes’) through separate trade agreements. Meanwhile, ‘the spokes only gain 
access to the hub market which becomes increasingly competitive as new 
spokes are added ... investors prefer to invest in the hub market rather than its 
spokes because it ensures them access to a much larger market’ (van den Hoven 
2004: 221; Zorob 2006b: 142-3). 
vii The tenth interim report of the UN International Independent 
Investigation Commission into the murder of Hariri and others notes that 
‘cooperation provided by the Syrian authorities [for the Commission’s mission] 
continues to be generally satisfactory’ (United Nations 2008: 8). The same 
report does not provide new information about the outcome of the inquiry. 
viii The 1977 EC-Syria Cooperation Agreement already grants Syria duty-
free entry for all industrial goods. 
ix As has been dryly noted, to ‘include the WMD clause might be 
politically necessary and justifiable. For the Syrian-European AA to function as 
an effective commitment mechanism for economic reform, however, its 
definition as an essential element and the potential it provides for both parties to 
use it as an ‘exit option’ seems inappropriate’ (Zorob 2008: 10). 
x The first section of the document contains an ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ 
followed by the text of the Agreement. In the former case, reference is given to 
page numbers and in the latter case to the Agreement’s relevant article. 
xi The second line in Article 15 of the draft Agreement appears to wrongly 
refer to Article 12 rather than Article 14 as the logical coherence of the 
document would suggest. 
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xii At present, the Syrian mobile phone market is shared between two 
companies, Syriatel and Investcom. Both companies have close links to the 
Syrian government. In the event of future market access for competitors, these 
businesses might suffer losses. The main shareholder of Syriatel was reported to 
consider selling his shares to the Turkish mobile phone company Turkcell. The 
negotiations did attract the close scrutiny of the US government which placed 
pressure on American shareholders in Turkcell and threatened the company’s 
management that they would not be allowed in future to enter the US. The 
negotiations have subsequently been abandoned (Turkish Financial News 2008). 
xiii On the official Syrian Arab News Agency website, the Syrian 
government holds claim to 15 million Syrian expatriates, who are already 
providing significant remittance transfers and who are seen as an important 
constituency to support domestic economic reform and development. 
xiv However, Syria’s new private banks have started to make significant 
inroads in capturing a large share of credit provision to the private sector (IMF 
2007b: 9, 24). 
xv The relative strength of public and private sector crucially depends on 
the statistical distinction between GDP and non-oil GDP. If the former is used, 
the public sector contributes according to IMF data 40 per cent while the latter 
reduces this to only 23 per cent (2005). Most recent data suggests that the public 
sector share of GDP has fallen below 20 per cent (IMF 2007a). 
xvi The term MAFTA has not become established in common usage. 
Instead, most subsequent sources refer to it as ‘Agadir Agreement’. The main 
feature of the Agreement is that the four signatories use the EU’s rules of origin 
allowing them to cumulate inputs from each of the four states in their exports 
for the purpose of accessing the EU’s preferential tariff. 
xvii It is generally acknowledged by Syrian and foreign observers that 
Syrian statistical figures do not follow international standards and might be 
misleading. This is due to weak data gathering but also to objective problems 
such as how to adequately measure seasonal employment in agriculture for the 
purposes of defining employment status. Moreover, official Syrian 
unemployment figures assume unrealistically low female participation rates in 
the labour market. 
xviii  For example, the Syrian-Iranian car manufacturing plants (SIAMCO 
and SIVECO) have so far failed to have a major impact. The former, announced 
as a major step in Syrian-Iranian economic cooperation, is projected to employ 
only 330 workers and to assemble 10,000 car kits of Iranian origin annually at 
some future point. The demand of SIAMCO management to receive special tax 
treatment to facilitate competition with imported cars is therefore likely to carry 
little weight for the time being and only 2,700 cars had been sold until February 
2008 (Syria Today 2007a, Champress 2008). The second plant, SIVECO, it has 
been announced will be a larger project. 
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xix Some of the sources give different figures which might be due to 
different methods of data gathering. In particular, as of yet unofficial figures of 
the Central Bureau of Statistics on Syrian exports in 2006, reported on the blog 
joshualandis.com (2007), hold that exports to Iraq might be much lower than 
suggested in the EU statistics that are reproduced in table 3 below. 
xx The latest available Syrian import and export figures (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2005) differ from the EU figures to some extent. In particular, they 
underline the major significance of two EU member states, Italy and France, 
which together absorb 33 per cent out of 45 per cent of all Syrian exports 
towards the EU. The Syrian import figures suggest that Italy and Germany are 
the two major EU exporters but non-EU states such as Ukraine and Russia are 
comparatively more important.  
xxi In this context, the IMF puts forward at least one unorthodox suggestion 
in holding that the progressivity of Syrian income tax could be enhanced (IMF 
2007a: 9). 
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2 
Trade Liberalization and Adjustment 
via Regional Integration: The Syrian-
European Association Agreement 
ANJA ZORUB 
Introductionxxii 
The liberalization of trade and the change to an outward-oriented 
strategy of development is one of the most sensitive issues of economic 
reform in developing countries. Regional integration and in particular an 
agreement with a large country or block ‘in the North’ may allow a 
developing country not only to credibly lock-in and/or catalyze trade 
reforms but may also contribute to promoting exports and investment. In 
addition, agreements of regional integration (RIAs) can deliver an 
instrument to overcome political-economic constraints on liberalization 
and adjustment. As the last of all Mediterranean Partner Countries 
(MPCs), Syria initialed an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU in 
October 2004. More than three years have elapsed and this most 
comprehensive of all agreements agreed upon between the EU and its 
Mediterranean Partners is still pending formal signature. European 
diplomats keep repeating the political ‘prerequisites’ which must be 
fulfilled for the European Council to finally approve the Syrian-
European AA. Abdallah Dardari, on the other hand, the ‘spearhead’ of 
economic reform in Syria and signatory of the draft agreement in 
Brussels in 2004, seems recently to have considered dropping the 
agreement altogether. In 2006 he was quoted for the first time as saying 
that the liberalization measures implemented in recent years would have 
gone beyond those anchored in the AA. At least it would need to be 
renegotiated. What are the reasons behind this shift in perception? Do 
reforms implemented in recent years really make this agreement 
dispensable? What were and/or still are its potential benefits? What are 
the risks and challenges to be expected from the AA? These are the 
issues this paper wants to shed some light on. To do so, it will take a 
closer look at what has been achieved as regards trade liberalization in 
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Syria compared to the situation when the AA was negotiated and finally 
agreed upon. In addition, the paper will evaluate selected potential 
effects of the agreement taking into account the conditions currently 
prevailing in Syria. 
 The structure of the paper will be as follows. After a short 
theoretical introduction section two describes the basic characteristics 
and constraints of the Syrian process of economic reform focusing on 
the foreign trade system at the beginning of the 2000s and outlines the 
structure and main content of the Syrian-European Association 
Agreement. Section three investigates the stimuli which the AA could 
offer for liberalization and adjustment and the challenges its 
implementation is expected to create for the Syrian economy. The 
potential effects to be evaluated in this paper, using economic theory of 
trade and integration as a framework of analysis, include the static 
effects of trade creation, trade diversion and loss of tariff revenues in 
addition to the effect of securing and enhancing market access.  
 
The Political Economy of Trade Reform and the Syrian – 
European AA 
Trade Reform and its Political-economic Constraints 
The liberalization of trade and the change to an outward-oriented 
strategy of development is generally regarded as one of the major 
elements of structural adjustment.xxiii According to standard economic 
theory and in particular its neo-liberal approaches, the target of trade 
reform and liberalization is to enhance efficiency and improve the 
national economy’s growth potential.xxiv At the same time, trade 
liberalization is one of the most sensitive issues of economic reform in 
developing countries as the theory and empirical evidence on the 
political economy of transformation suggest. Political-economic 
constraints to trade reform are among the most important reasons why 
trade liberalization is in most cases implemented on a gradual basis and 
not according to the so-called “shock-approach” favored by neoliberal 
economists. They seem to play a particularly strong role in systems 
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where the transfer and maintenance of power is not determined by 
political elections. In authoritarian systems in which several family clans 
dominate political as well as economic life, the definition of a long-term 
growth strategy to improve public welfare is most probably not the 
leading motive driving economic decision-making. Assuming that 
politically relevant protagonists act rationally in order to maximize their 
own benefit as laid out in the theories of New Political Economics or 
Public Choice, and as part of it the theory of interest groups, the ruling 
elite is primarily interested in political ‘survival.’ Accordingly, it is 
important for the government to consider the impact of trade reform on 
the interests of different groups of the society on which it relied in the 
past or is going to rely on in the future. Among those who are generally 
regarded as reform opponents are the domestic industry engaged in 
import-substituting production, the import business, the public organs 
enforcing administration of import substitution, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and the trade unions. These groups are expected to lose access to 
rents which are generated by protecting the domestic market and by 
strictly controlling foreign trade. Moreover, public officials could be 
counted among the potential reform losers. They risk being deprived of 
at least some of their personal privileges and fortunes derived from any 
stake they have in business or from being closely related to those people 
who do. Against this background it is questionable if the government 
and/or the ruling elite or more generally those trying to push through 
reform in a specific country are willing and able to go for 
comprehensive trade reform. In case they are willing to do so, they need 
to acquire the approval for their plan from a sufficient number of the 
politically relevant interest groups. Such an endeavor most probably 
requires making compromises as regards magnitude, choice and speed 
of reform measures. Alternatively they could try to substitute some of 
the groups previously belonging to their ‘supporting coalition’ and thus 
opposing liberalization with new groups set to benefit from opening the 
domestic market to international competition. Such an approach, 
however, might prove even more risky (see, for instance, Nienhaus 
2000).    Guaranteeing continuity of trade reform against the interests of 
its opponents, and thus ensuring its sustainability and credibility, 
requires the government and/or the ruling elite to prevent those interests 
being fully exerted. To achieve this end, the government should, as 
recommended by the literature on trade reform, embark on a critical and 
comprehensive first phase of liberalization measures as a way to signal 
its readiness to reform to both domestic interest groups and external 
actors. At the same time it should announce a schedule of further steps. 
In addition, those measures could be accompanied by the establishment 
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of an independent reform unit as a means of shielding decision makers 
from pressure exerted by different interest groups (see Bender 1995; for 
a more elaborate discussion of trade reform and its political-economic 
constraints see Zorob 2007: pp. 58-64). Finally, from a longer-term 
perspective, reforms may be promoted and ‘locked in’ if the government 
agrees a programme of structural adjustment (SAP) with the IMF and 
World Bank or ‘ties its hands’ by becoming a member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Alternatively, it could reach a trade 
agreement with a large block ‘in the North’ like the EU (see, for 
example, Galal and Hoekman 1997). The latter could also contribute to 
promoting exports and investment by granting domestic suppliers 
improved access to the partner’s market via reciprocal elimination or 
reduction of tariff and other barriers to trade. At the same time and in a 
similar way as cooperation with the IMF in implementing a SAP such a 
treaty offers the government opportunities to blame the external actor or 
partner for the economic hardships to be expected from opening the 
domestic market. 
Characteristics and Constraints of the Syrian Process of Economic 
Reform at the Beginning of the 2000s 
Like many other countries in the MENA region, Syria experienced two 
phases of economic reform between the end of the 1960s and the 
beginning of the 1990s. The scope and sector coverage of measures 
conducted during the first period or infitah between 1970-1977/78 and 
the following second phase starting in 1984/85 and lasting until 1991 
remained relatively limited when compared to regional neighbors. 
Whereas the latter in most cases opted for cooperation with the IMF and 
the World Bank to implement structural adjustment programmes, Syria 
refused external intervention. 
 The process of economic reform restarted already shortly before 
Bashar al-Assad came to power following his fathers’ death in June 
2000 albeit still hesitantly and generally retaining the gradual and 
selective approach of the previous reform phases. Reforms 
accomplished until 2003/04 have included most notably steps to unify 
exchange rates, to devalue the Syrian currency and to partly, however 
hesitantly, liberalize foreign trade. The possession of foreign exchange 
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was legalized and the rule of financing the import of specific goods from 
foreign exchange earned through exports was abolished. In addition, the 
government eliminated the monopoly of import agencies and gradually 
lifted provisions prohibiting or limiting imports on a product-by-product 
basis. Customs duties were decreased for selected goods, mainly raw 
materials. Moreover, Syria signed bilateral free trade agreements with 
several Arab countries and Turkey. It became a member of the “Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA),” which began operating fully, at least 
officially, in 2005. In 2001, the Syrian administration applied for 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) albeit without 
success. Other reforms concentrated primarily on banking and 
insurance. Private banking was allowed in Syria for the first time since 
its nationalisation in the 1960s. In the field of investment, Investment 
Law No. 10 was amended and a new law on investment in the free zones 
was passed. In addition, Syria joined the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency. As regards fiscal policy a new personal and 
corporate income tax law lowered tax rates to a substantial degree. This 
law was accompanied by another law against tax evasion (for more 
details see Zorob 2005).  
 Despite several trade reforms, the Syrian foreign trade system in 
2003/04 when the draft Syrian-European AA was finally agreed upon 
had still to be classified as being severely restrictive. Tariffs on imports 
into Syria remained high with the maximum rate including a unified 
surcharge on imports being as high as 235% in the 2001 tariff schedule. 
In addition to duties sharply escalating with stages of processing, the use 
of non-tariff barriers was still pervasive. In 2004, the import of more 
than one third of all goods according to the 8-digit level of the 
Harmonized System (HS) was completely prohibited, whereas other 
goods were allowed to be imported only by producers, selected 
industrial branches and/or the public enterprises (Zorob 2006b: 150). 
Other non-tariff barriers included import quotas, import licensing 
requirements and costly customs clearing procedures. The Syrian 
authorities also delayed the elimination of goods exempted from the 
scheme of tariff reductions allowed for in the provisions of the GAFTA 
Executive Program. The exemptions originally had to be ended in 
September 2002. Whereas other countries like Jordan or Lebanon 
reportedly lifted the exemptions as scheduled, Syria maintained them. 
Measures of export promotion, finally, were also described as still being 
weak at that date. Export prohibitions, export licenses and prior 
approvals for most goods to be exported had been abolished. Syrian fee 
zones, however, did not prove to be very successful in developing and 
enhancing Syrian exports (see IMF 2006b: 48; Owen 2005).  
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 All in all, economic reforms gained in scope and sector 
coverage in the first years of the 2000s as compared to previous reform 
periods. Nevertheless, the gradual and selective approach was generally 
retained. In addition, several new laws proved difficult to implement and 
‘hot issues’ like privatization of SOEs were kept off the official agenda 
of reform. Also reforms of the foreign trade regime remained piecemeal. 
They were not at any rate sufficient to form a ‘critical and 
comprehensive first phase of measures’ signaling ‘a clear brake with the 
past’ as recommended in the literature. In general, and despite that the 
transformation to a market economy seemed to be accepted as the 
principal target, the government was lacking a clear definition of this 
target and a strategy of how to achieve it. A first comprehensive reform 
programme was drafted and widely discussed in Syrian newspapers. It 
was however never approved by the Syrian government. Accordingly, 
liberalization measures were still implemented on a rather ad hoc basis 
(for more details see Zorob 2005). 
 As a result of this piecemeal and inefficient approach to 
liberalization and adjustment, Syrian companies at that time were still 
enjoying a high degree of protection and thus had little incentives to 
switch from import-substitution to export-oriented production (see also 
Aita 2005). This strong anti-export bias was best reflected in the very 
low level of export development and international integration of the 
Syrian economy even compared to most of its regional neighbors. As 
illustrated in Table 1, Syrian exports per capita were considerably 
smaller in volume in comparison to countries like Jordan or Tunisia. In 
addition, most of Syria’s exported goods were primary goods, in 
particular oil, accounting for 89 percent of total Syrian exports. Only 11 
percent of Syrian exports were made up of manufactured goods and only 
one percent represented high-technology goods. In the other Arab 
Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) except Algeria the share of 
manufactured goods in total exports ranged between 31 percent in Egypt 
and 81 percent in Tunisia. Lack of export development, in turn, 
coincided with low levels of foreign and domestic private investment as 
well as low growth of the Syrian economy in general at the end of the 
1990s and the first years of the 2000s. Against this background a report 
on the Syrian economy commissioned by the Syrian State Planning 
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Commission (SPC) and published in 2005 declared this period as “lost 
years” for the Syrian economy (see SPC 2005).   
 The outlook for a substantial widening and deepening of the 
process of economic reform, and accompanying trade liberalization and 
export promotion, were rather bleak at the time the agreement with the 
EU was negotiated. One of the most important reform constraints 
seemed to be and still remains today domestic opposition to 
liberalization. Those who would inevitably lose from trade liberalization 
are domestic industries producing for the local market, import 
businesses, the public administration and the SOEs. Other groups or 
agents with ‘vested interests’ in maintaining the system as it is include 
public sector managers, the security services or those in the private 
sector whose success in business depends in large part on a ‘privileged 
relationship’ to public sector companies and/or the administration. Even 
members of the government or, in other words, those who are 
responsible for the design and implementation of economic reforms may 
be afraid to forgo personal privileges and fortunes by opening up the 
Syrian market to foreign competition. 
Table 1: Trade Orientation in Arab Mediterranean Partner Countries, 
2004 
  
 Trade1 / 
GDP 
Exports 
per capita 
Primary 
goods / Ex-
ports  
(2003) 
Manufactured 
goods / Exports  
(2003) 
High-
technology 
goods / Exports 
(2003) 
 in % in U.S.-$ in % in % in % 
Algeria 59.6 997 98 2 2 
Egypt 26.0 106 63 31 (.) 
Jordan 104.9 720 31 69 2 
Lebanon 51.2 499 31 68 2 
Morocco 54.7 327 31 69 11 
Syria 46.7 265 89 11 1 
Tunisia 79.6 978 19 81 4 
1Trade in goods. Source: Zorob (2007), p. , Table 3. 
Besides domestic opposition, other constraints included the lack of an 
external actor with whom the Syrian administration could work to push 
through reform. A programme or an agreement with an external actor 
like the IMF offers the opportunity of assistance to finance reforms as 
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well as social measures to cushion the inescapable negative effects of 
trade reform on labour and income. However, relations to the IMF and 
World Bank besides many of Western donor countries on the bilateral 
level, for example Germany, at this time only started to be restored. 
Finally, due to its international isolation and reportedly “stiff resistance” 
from the US, Syria’s accession to the WTO was blocked and US 
resistance would have ruled out also any agreement on a SAP if the 
Syrian administration had wished to apply for such a programme. 
Finally, to complete the picture on the situation at the time the 
agreement with the EU was drafted, three further factors impeding the 
Syrian process of economic reform must be added. These factors 
comprised on the one hand of a general lack of domestic capacities for 
design and implementation of reforms. On the other hand and connected 
to this a ‘reform team’ in the administration able and prepared to push 
for further reforms seemed not to exist. In addition, Syria was and is still 
lacking an effective and sufficient social security system needed to 
mitigate the negative effects of liberalization.  
All these obstacles and constraints on economic reform characterised the 
situation in which the Syrian-European AA was negotiated and finally 
agreed upon. Although observers agree that it was from the beginning a 
political choice for the Syrians to join the Barcelona process, the 
opportunities which an agreement like the AA could offer for catalyzing 
and credibly lock-in reform may have been an additional motivation, at 
least for the allegedly small circle of those in the political elite 
supporting economic opening. With this agreement the latter would have 
an instrument at hand with which they could justify unpopular reforms 
vis-à-vis reform opponents and the population at large. Besides the 
opportunity to lock-in reform, this agreement could contribute to the 
potential for growth and development through the channels of trade, 
investment and transfers of technology. Nevertheless, negotiations on 
the AA entered a critical stage only after the Americans invaded 
neighboring Iraq confronting the Syrian leadership with the threat of 
being the next potential target. To escape this fate and to find a strong 
international partner also in the face of further economic sanctions to be 
imposed by the US administration, the Syrian negotiators seem to have 
been prepared to accept not only far-reaching economic provisions but 
also several purely political elements demanded by the EU. Finally, the 
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Syrian negotiators faced the same problem as all other MPCs and 
developing countries in general: the blatant asymmetry of relations or 
fundamental lack of bargaining power when a small country such as 
Syria tries to negotiate a treaty with a strong and developed partner or 
large block like the EU. 
  A first draft of the agreement was reached in December 2003 
but was blocked for the by Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands 
requesting a tightening of the treaty’s clause on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD). As Raymond Hinnebusch (2005) has argued, the 
Syrian-European AA was delayed by EU member countries “acting on 
behalf of Washington’s agenda.” After a months-long tug-of-war about 
the exact wording of this clause, the agreement was finally initialed in 
October 2004 only to be put on hold again. Among the political 
‘prerequisites’ which must be fulfilled for the AA to get the approval by 
the European Council are, among others, an adequate cooperation of the 
Syrian government with the international tribunal to investigate the 
killing of the former Lebanese prime minister al-Hariri and the 
restoration of full diplomatic relations with the neighboring country1  
Despite the failure to finalize the agreement, economic reforms in 
general and measures to streamline and liberalize the Syrian foreign 
trade regime nevertheless accelerated considerably. The Baath Party 
Regional Congress of June 2005 recommended the transition of the 
Syrian system into a social market economy. Moreover, in May 2006 the 
Syrian president signed into law the Tenth Five Year Plan (10th FYP) 
which is based on a completely different logic and methodology than 
former Syrian development plans and is viewed by many as a 
comprehensive programme for liberalization and adjustment of the 
Syrian economy.  
Against this background some Syrian and international experts argue 
that with the year 2004 the process of economic reform in Syria entered 
a new phase, the phase of “neoliberal economic development”. 
According to Samir Aita’s (2008; see also Aita 2006) interpretation, 
those behind this new orientation were the members of what he calls the 
Syrian “power system.” This “power system” which controls the most 
powerful bodies within the regime like the presidency, the presidential 
guard and the intelligence apparatus would have to be distinguished as a 
separate interest group from the “state”. The power system follows its 
own logic of production and reproduction and should be regarded as the 
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prime decision maker in the Syrian system whereas the state as a group 
of institutions, among them the government, only execute policies. 
Moreover, Aita maintains that “foreign threats” provoked the power 
system’s decision to push through first the swift drafting of the 
agreement with the EU and second, after its signature was put on hold, 
the widening and deepening of trade reforms after 2004. In earlier 
periods political instability and international pressure has in contrast 
been used as an excuse for postponing economic reforms. 
 This coincided roughly with two other developments or rather 
changes in behavior of those in charge of economic policy in Syria. 
First, the Syrian administration apparently started to ask for or at least to 
accept international aid in the form of technical assistance and economic 
policy advice. One of the most striking examples for this was most 
probably the process of drawing up the 10th FYP in which the Syrian 
administration, in particular the SPC, received support from UNDP, 
ESCWA, the German GTZ and the EU. Besides policy advice and 
consultancy, technical assistance is channeled into restructuring of 
ministries and other public institutions including capacity building to 
make the staff of these organs capable of devising and implementing 
economic reforms (Zorob 2006a). Second, the Syrian government 
seems, as Samir Seifan (2008) expressed it, to have “replaced” critical 
public debate of its programme of economic reform with the 10th FYP. 
This does not mean that the discussion on reforms, economic policy and 
the economic situation in general so lively at the beginning of the 
decade after Bashar al-Asad came to power has stopped. The lecture 
series in the framework of the “Economic Tuesday Symposium” for 
example are ongoing and economic issues are well covered in several 
newly established economic and political journals and even in the 
government controlled newspapers. However and again using the words 
of Samir Seifan, the government decided in 2005 to check the reform 
dialogue “within the official limits.”    
  
Main Structure and Contents of the Syrian-European AA 
Table 2 shows the general structure of the draft agreement and 
emphasizes those titles and chapters (italicized and shaded lines) in 
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which the Syrian-European AA contains broader and/or deeper 
provisions than the AAs concluded with the other MPCs. In general the 
agreement consists of provisions for each of the three “baskets” of the 
European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) as agreed to by the EU and 
its Mediterranean Partners at the Barcelona conference in November 
1995 (see European Commission 1996). Objectives and measures of the 
first basket or Political and Security Partnership on the bilateral track 
between Syria and the EU are covered in the provisions of Title I. They 
provide for a framework to conduct a regular political dialogue on issues 
of mutual interest and for cooperation in different areas. In defining 
‘essential elements’ of the treaty the Syrian-European Partnership 
Agreement goes clearly beyond the provisions contained in the 
agreements with the other MPCs. In addition to the respect for the 
principles of democracy and human rights and in line with the Council 
Decision of 17 November 2003, the Agreement contains as an essential 
element cooperation to counter the proliferation of WMD and their 
means of delivery through full compliance with existing obligations 
under disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements. The 
Agreements’ provisions on cooperation in the framework of the 
Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs or third basket are 
also more elaborate and contain more commitments and fields of 
cooperation as compared to the agreements with the other MPCs. The 
different areas of cooperation extend from culture and social 
development to justice, with special focus on the independence of the 
judiciary, the prevention and control of illegal immigration and the fight 
against organized crime and terrorism. 
 
 Table 2: General Structure of the Draft EU-Syria Partnership Agreement 
Article 2 Respect for the Democratic Principles and Fundamental Human Rights 
Title 1 Political Dialogue and Cooperation 
 ° Article 3: Regular Political Dialogue 
 ° Article 4+5: Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Title II Free Movement of Goods 
 ° Chapter 1: Elimination of Customs Duties 
 ° Chapter 2: Common Provisions 
 ° Chapter 3: Customs and Related Matters 
Title III Right of Establishment and Services 
 ° Chapter 1: Right of Establishment 
 ° Chapter 2: Cross-Border Supply of Services 
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 ° Chapter 3: General Provisions 
Title IV Payments, Capital Movements and Other Economic Matters 
 ° Chapter 1: Payments and Capital Movements 
 ° Chapter 2: Competition 
 ° Chapter 3: Government Procurement  
 ° Chapter 4: Other Economic Matters 
Title V Dispute Settlement 
Title VI Economic Co-operation 
Title VII Co-operation in Social and Cultural Matters 
 ° Chapter 1: Social Dialogue 
 ° Chapter 2: Social Co-operation Actions 
 ° Chapter 3: Cultural Co-operation 
Title VIII Co-operation in the Fields of Justice, Migration, and the Fight against Organised 
Crime 
Title IX Co-operation on Counter-Terrorism 
Title X Financial Co-operation 
Title XI Institutional, General and Final Provisions 
 Source: Own compilation based on European Commission (2004c):  
 
 
 The economic provisions are not only much broader in scope 
and depth than the provisions included in the AAs with the other MPCs. 
In some aspects they even resemble those anchored in the EU’s ‘most 
advanced’ bilateral FTAs with Chile and Mexico which are however far 
more advanced with respect to their economic development and relative 
standing compared to the industrialized countries than is Syria. The 
basic element of the Economic and Financial Partnership or second 
basket is the gradual establishment of a free trade area (FTA) between 
Syria and the EU. With respect to Syrian exports of industrial products 
to the EU, the duty- and quantitative restrictions-free access already 
granted under the Cooperation Agreement signed by the Parties in 1977 
is reconfirmed. Now, however, under the EMP, the establishment of the 
FTA first of all implies the complete opening-up of the Syrian market 
for European industrial goods. The measures which have to be 
implemented by the Syrian administration immediately after the treaty 
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has come into force, consist of the elimination of all import or export 
restrictions on trade between Syria and the EU, including prohibitions, 
quotas and import or export licensing requirements. Customs duties and 
other surcharges applicable to the import of industrial products into 
Syria will be reduced in a linear manner to zero according to different 
schedules over a transitional period of 12 years starting from the date on 
which the agreement enters into force. Reciprocal trade in agricultural 
products, processed agricultural products and fisheries between the EU 
and Syria shall be liberalized progressively. Syria, however, committed 
to a far-ranging opening of its agricultural market (for more details see 
Section 3.1). In addition, trade between Syria and the EU will be bound 
by the principles set out in the WTO Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures as well as the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. As regards standards, the 
Parties agreed to take steps to encourage the use of EU standards and 
technical regulations in Syria and Syria committed itself to 
comprehensively reform and modernize customs procedures in line with 
EU and international standards. 
 With respect to investment, Syria grants European investors 
national or MFN treatment (whichever is better) for right of 
establishment and operations in Syria. The branches excluded from the 
general right of establishment include primarily the production of goods 
and services which were reserved for government monopolies at the 
time of negotiating the agreement such as wholesale trade in wheat and 
cotton. In other sectors like wholesale trade, transport or construction a 
minimum Syrian ownership is required which in most cases is set at 25 
percent. Furthermore, within a year of the treaty coming into force Syria 
committed itself to put forward a schedule for opening the 
telecommunications industry within six years at the most. Besides the 
right of establishment the parties undertake to allow, except in cases of 
serious balance-of-payments difficulties, all payments for current 
transactions to be made in a freely convertible currency and shall ensure 
the free movement of capital relating to FDI as well as free liquidation 
and repatriation of capital and profits. As regards competition rules, 
Syria committed itself to taking into consideration the EU rules when 
formulating its own law. Moreover, and in contrast to the agreements 
concluded with the other MPCs, the parties will cooperate on the 
enforcement of competition rules. As far as government procurement is 
concerned, and again contrary to the other MPCs, the parties agreed to 
open procurement activities and to grant national treatment to the other 
party’s goods, services and suppliers for a list of entities annexed to the 
agreement. This means, for example, that the Syrian Ministry of 
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Irrigation, which is included in the list on Syria’s government 
procurement annexed to the AA, is not allowed to discriminate in favor 
of local Syrian suppliers against European competitors by way of 
specific rules, procedures or practices of procurement. The effective 
opening of procurement markets will be reviewed regularly. With 
respect to intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights, the 
partners committed themselves to granting and ensuring their protection 
in accordance with the highest international standards including the 
principles set by the WTO-Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). For this purpose Syria agreed to 
accede to a number of multilateral conventions according to a specific 
calendar. Finally, the trade and trade-related provisions of the treaty will 
be applied by both partners in advance pending its entry into force by 
means of an interim agreement. 
 
Incentives for Trade Liberalisation and Adjustment in the AA 
Opening-Up the Syrian Market: Trade Creation, Trade Diversion and 
Tariff Revenue Losses 
In the following sections the analysis of the Syrian-European AA will 
concentrate primarily on two major effects or group of effects of free 
trade and integration: on the one hand the static effects of trade creation, 
trade diversion and tariff revenue losses and on the other hand the effect 
of securing and enhancing market access. By doing so it will investigate 
the direct and indirect incentives or stimuli the AA is offering for trade 
liberalization and adjustment and compare it to what has been achieved 
in trade reform in recent years. In addition, the expected impact of these 
effects will be evaluated illustrating the challenges the implementation 
of the AA will probably create for the Syrian economy. 
 As noted above, the establishment of the FTA with the EU first 
of all implies the complete opening-up of the Syrian market for 
European industrial goods. Except for cars, all duties above 50% will be 
brought down to 50% at the entry into force and be abolished in twelve 
years. Tariff rates for cars at 255% (145%) shall be reduced to 150% 
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(65%) in the first three years and then be gradually reduced to zero 
during the rest of the transition period. Similar to industrial goods, 
customs duties applicable to the import of agricultural products into 
Syria will be dismantled to zero in a linear manner within 12 years 
according to different schedules. Annual tariff quotas at zero duty have 
been established for the EU’s export of several sorts of oranges, 
mandarins and fresh apples. Wholesale services for ‘strategic products’ 
like wheat, tobacco and cotton which are to date under government 
monopoly will not be opened to foreign competition. Duties on imports 
of selected fisheries and a large number of processed agricultural 
products into Syria will be reduced to zero according to different 
schedules in a linear manner latest until the end of the twelve years 
transitions period as well. Quotas at reduced MFN-duties have been set 
for EU-exports of mineral water, soft drinks, spirits, cigarettes and 
tobacco. 
 Despite the many measures of trade liberalization enacted since 
the initialization of the AA in 2004, the above outlined provisions would 
translate into a major further opening of the Syrian market. 
Nevertheless, the tariff reductions implemented on the unilateral level 
and elimination of import prohibitions anticipate some of the measures 
integrated in the AA. Maximum tariff rates have already been reduced to 
50 percent or 60 percent respectively with the latter rate only applying to 
selected goods of HS 87, i.e. the category of vehicles and parts thereof. 
The number of rates has declined to eleven ranging between 1-60 % 
excluding a surcharge which however applies only to a part of goods 
and amounts to 1 percent or 15 percent depending on the product 
concerned (see Syrian Customs 2008). In addition, many import 
prohibitions have been eliminated in recent years and in particular 
during the second half of the last and this year. Officials from the 
Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade announced in the Syrian media 
that the new negative list published at the end of April this year mainly 
contains goods which are still prohibited from importation to Syria 
because of religious, health, security or environmental reasons (see for 
example Ma’la 2008). The new negative list covers only seven pages of 
goods according to the 4-digit HS-level reduced from initially 63 pages 
in 2006. A closer look at the new list however shows that around 30 
percent of agricultural goods (HS 1-24) and 10 % of industrial products 
according to the 4-digit HS-level are still banned from importation 
and/or can only be imported by public entities or selected branches of 
the economy. As regards agricultural produce, many fresh and chilled 
fruits and vegetables are among the goods still prohibited from 
importation. It should be mentioned in this context however that 
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agriculture is protected by tariff and other barriers in almost every 
country on this earth and in particular in the industrialized world! 
Besides tariff reductions and lifting of import prohibitions, the first steps 
for a streamlining of customs procedures have been taken. Accordingly, 
the Syrian-European AA offers on the one hand the possibility to 
anchoring the measures enacted in recent years on the unilateral level by 
a binding legal agreement. On the other hand, additional reforms or a 
deepened opening of the Syrian market could be catalyzed by the 
provisions of the AA. 
 But what are the effects to be expected from the AA as regards 
trade creation, trade diversion and loss of tariff revenues.?2 In general, 
the expected positive effects of regional integration on trade, investment 
and growth cannot be determined a priori. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
establish a set of different criteria or preconditions which should be met 
by a ‘successful’ free trade or regional integration agreement. Of crucial 
importance is the degree of openness of the agreement, the existence of 
mechanisms for enforcing the agreement’s provisions in addition to 
purely political preconditions like a peaceful environment. Another 
criterion applies to the form and content of an RIA and its degree of 
“deepness.” Because the probability of positive effects increases with 
the decline of barriers to transactions and the costs to overcome them, an 
RIA will be the more beneficial the more it contributes to eliminate 
restrictions ‘behind the border’ in addition to the reduction of 
transaction costs caused by ‘border’ barriers such as customs duties (for 
more details on the theoretical background and the ‘preconditions’ 
developed in the literature see, among others, Borrmann 1997; Schiff 
and Winters 2003; Zorob 2006b). 
 Albeit the nominal average tariff has declined from more than 
20 percent at the time when the AA was negotiated to 14.5 percent now, 
tariff protection remains substantial in Syria with maximum rates at 60 
percent and rates escalating with the stage of processing. In addition, 
there are still goods banned from importation and a host of other non-
tariff barriers in place. Therefore the introduction of free trade with the 
EU promises substantial effects of trade creation. EU exports to Syria 
would likely expand, particularly in those branches where production is 
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currently protected by high tariffs and other trade barriers and where the 
Syrian economy does not enjoy comparative advantages; this means that 
many of Syria’s import-substituting and especially capital-intensive 
industries in the public sector may come under strong pressure. As 
regards agricultural products, the still numerous import prohibitions, in 
many cases high tariffs and the maintenance of competitive production 
structures of Syria and the EU particularly in typical temperate zone 
products such as bovine meat, dairy products, vegetable oils, corn and 
wheat promise substantial efficiency effects. The process of adjustment 
might however be distorted to a substantial degree because both parties 
are subsidizing for example production of cereals and the prohibition of 
subsidies is not stipulated as target in the AA. 
Figure 1: Syrian Imports, 2000-2006 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on data extracted from UN 
Comtrade Database. 
 
 The impact of recent trade reforms on the probability of the AA 
to generate trade-diverting effects seem to be rather ambiguous. 
Whereas the elimination of import bans aggravates the risk of trade 
diversion, tariff reductions are diminishing it. Preference margins for 
European suppliers and therefore the potential for trade diversion should 
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be low in such product categories and branches where customs duties 
have been reduced to no more than one or three percent which is 
according to the new Syrian tariff schedule the case for most of raw 
materials and other inputs of production as well as capital goods. In 
trade in most goods for final consumption, however, the risk of trade 
diversion, i.e. switching with the dismantling of tariffs on imports 
sourced in the EU from more cost-efficient (for example Chinese 
suppliers) to less cost-efficient European suppliers thereby forgoing 
tariff revenues, remains substantial because tariffs are still high with 
maximum rates as high as 50 or 60 percent. In addition, only a relatively 
small part of Syrian imports is currently originating in the EU. Whereas 
imports in general soared in recent years as illustrated in Figure 1, 
imports from the EU more or less stagnated with its value in 2006 being 
only slightly higher than that in 2001. As a result, the share of imports 
from Europe in total Syrian imports dropped from some 35 percent in 
2001 to below 20 % in 2006 (see Table3).  
 When imports from the Arab countries and Turkey are added 
with whom Syria has signed and started to implement free trade 
agreements, the share of trade that would be included within free trade 
zones were the AA to be implemented, jumps to 40 percent. Since these 
partners together are currently the most important sources for Syrian 
imports of mineral and chemical products (HS 25-26, 28-38) and tariffs 
in these product categories are generally low, the risk of trade diversion 
should also be low. There is, however, a high risk of trade diversion in 
most categories of other manufactured goods as well as agricultural 
produce where imports in large part originate in the “rest of the world” 
category. This is also the case for the category of machines and vehicles 
(HS 84-89) which traditionally contributed a large part to Syrian imports 
from the EU, but in which Syrian importers have increasingly switched 
in recent years to suppliers from other regions of the world and in 
particular Asian countries. In addition, this kind of import coming from 
the EU comprises a large proportion of the equipment for Syrian 
industry for which customs duties are generally rather low in contrast, 
for example, to cars and other vehicles for private use which are mostly 
delivered by Asian suppliers. Since many of these goods are still subject 
to high tariffs, there is a substantial risk of trade diverting effects 
associated with the discriminatory dismantling of trade barriers with the  
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Table 3 Sources of Syrian Imports according to Major Product Groups, 
2006 
Source:Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade Statistics 
Database. 
EU. To contain this risk as much as possible there seems to be no other 
way but to further reduce customs duties at the unilateral level.   
 There are, however, substantial efficiency and welfare 
enhancing effects to be expected from the implementation of trade 
facilitation measures anchored in the AA. Measures of this kind could 
lead to a reduction of transaction costs not only in trade with the EU, but 
also in trade with third countries. This would probably induce further 
trade creating effects besides saving costs which could contribute to 
compensating for the loss of tariff revenues in the state budget. Since the 
Syrian administration, however, seems more or less lacking not only the 
institutional capacities and technical expertise but also the financial 
means required to implement measures like streamlining and 
modernization of customs procedures or harmonization of standards, the 
EU should be prepared to back this process with generous financial and 
technical assistance probably in cooperation with other donors. The 
MEDA-funded Quality & Standards programme which aims at 
supporting the Syrian administration to develop the national capacities 
for formulation of technical rules and control of their implementation, 
finally started implementation in spring this year after years of delays. 
Additional efficiency gains are expected to be generated by the 
HS Product Group EU Arab 
Countries 
Turkey  Rest of the 
World 
Total 
as a share of total imports (in percent) 
1 bis 
24 
Agricultural Goods 
1.7 2.8 0.6 8.5 13.6 
27 Mineral Fuels 7.2 2.6 1.0 16.7 27.5 
25-38 Mineral and Chem-
ical Products 1.7 3.1 0.6 2.8 8.2 
39-49 Plastics, Paper, 
Hides, Wood and 
Articles Thereof 
1.2 4.0 0.3 4.8 10.3 
50-67 Textiles, Footwear 0.5 0.3 0.4 3.0 4.2 
68-83 Other Manufac-
tures 1.3 3.2 0.6 8.3 13.4 
84-89 Machines, Elect. 
Equipment, Vehi-
cles 
4.6 1.3 0.6 14.9 21.4 
90-97 Optical, Musical 
Instruments, Furni-
ture, Toys 
0.3 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.4 
Total   18.5 17.4 4.1 60.0 100.0 
56    Syria and the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship 
 
liberalization of trade-related and other services anchored in the AA. 
Streamlining of customs procedures and the liberalization of services 
seem on the other hand to be the only opportunities which the AA offers 
for Syrian manufacturers to reduce production costs since tariffs on most 
raw materials and other inputs of production are already relatively low. 
In this context it should be repeated that dismantling trade barriers with 
the EU will put strong pressure not only on the current account but also 
on Syrian firms in industry, agriculture and services. It must be expected 
that many domestic suppliers will be forced out of the market generating 
potentially high losses in the short to medium term in income and 
employment. Theoretically, the resources set free by liberalization will 
move to other, more competitive branches and sectors benefiting from 
the new division of labor between the partners to a FTA. The problem is, 
however, that chances for a reallocation of resources might not be ready 
available in a country like Syria. At least such a process will take time 
and depends crucially on the agreement’s contribution to improve 
market access of Syrian products to the EU. 
 To minimize the negative effects on production, income and 
employment to be expected as a result of trade liberalization with the 
EU, the Syrian administration could take steps to help Syrian firms to 
better prepare themselves for EU competition through a programme of 
‘mise-à-niveau’ in advance of the agreement’s implementation. In 
February 2007 a pilot programme called ‘Industrial Modernization and 
Upgrading Programme for the Syrian Arab Republic’ sponsored by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the 
Italian government started to be implemented which however seems not 
directly connected to the AA. This small programme would of course 
need to be substantially enlarged for which the EU also might provide 
additional funding. According to the revised National Indicative 
Programme (NIP) 2008-2010 for Syria, the EU has scheduled a 
programme for start of implementation in 2010 to support the 
modernization of state-owned industrial enterprises and their 
corporatization (see European Commission 2008). Moreover, the Syrian 
administration should take measures to cope with income and 
employment losses through the establishment of social safety nets for 
affected income groups which are currently lacking or are at least 
insufficient (see, for instance, IMF 2006b). Finally, and in case there is a 
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possibility for renegotiating the AA, one could think about prolonging 
the transition period of introducing free trade with the EU to gain more 
time for restructuring local enterprises. It may be noted here that Egypt 
succeeded in retaining a longer period of transition for specific industrial 
goods going beyond the 12-years period agreed to with Syria and the 
other MPCs. 
 Complementary measures such as social safety nets require 
substantial financial means which most probably must be provided to a 
large extent by the Syrian government. The liberalisation of trade with 
the EU, however, will generate losses in government revenues. These 
losses nevertheless should be manageable. First, tax revenues from 
international trade as shown in Table 4 are traditionally low, especially 
if compared to other MPCs, amounting to around 2 percent of GDP and 
7-9 percent of budget revenues in the period 2001-2006. Second, there 
are several alternatives at hand to develop the domestic tax base 
including the introduction of a VAT which is planned according to 
recent announcements for 2009. 
 
Table 4: Revenues from Tariffs and Other Taxes on International Trade 
in the  
  Syrian Budget, 2001-2006 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 
Revenues (tar-
iffs and other 
taxes on foreign 
trade) 
(LS billion) 
20.4 25.3 28.8 31.3 30.7 30.6 
As a Share of 
Total Budget 
Revenues 
(in percent) 
6.7 8.6 9.0 9.1 8.6 7.8 
As a Share of 
Tax Revenues 
(in percent) 
22.1 21.8 24.5 21.5 19.1 15.4 
As a Share of 
GDP 
(in percent) 
2.0 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.1 1.7 
*Preliminary estimates. Source: Partly author’s calculations 
based on data extracted from IMF (2006, 2007): Article IV 
Consultation – Staff Report. 
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 More problematic is the general state of the government budget 
with a rising deficit despite steady cut backs in investment expenditures 
in recent years as a result of declining oil export revenues and rising 
costs of government subsidies. A budget deficit amounting to 5.7 
percent in 2006 and the prospect of oil export revenues soon depleting 
completely will not leave much room to finance additional measures like 
a programme for industrial restructuring or the establishment of social 
safety nets. 
Promoting Exports and Diversification: Aid and Market Access  
Securing and enhancing market access is generally regarded as one of 
the most important dynamic effects of regional integration.xxv Better 
access for Syrian goods to the market of the EU could vitally contribute 
to support Syrian manufacturers switching from import-substituting to 
export-oriented sectors in the framework of an overall outward-oriented 
strategy of development. Benefits for Syria’s manufacturing sector could 
include market enlargement, the impulse to improve efficiency from 
competition, and greater incentives for inward investment, with 
technology transfer. Resources set free by the opening of the domestic 
market to European competition could be reallocated to those branches 
and sectors with export potential destined to the European market. 
 In general, however, the new RIAs concluded since the 
beginning of the 1990s aim for the most part at reconfirming the market 
access provisions achieved under former trade arrangements (i.e. 
‘historical’ preferences) and this is so for Syria. Syria had been granted 
duty-free access to the European market for its industrial goods in the 
framework of the 1977 cooperation agreement. The benefit to Syria of 
reconfirming these ‘historical’ preferences via the AA is however 
severely constrained first of all by the continuous erosion of these 
preferences in recent years caused by different factors including the 
EU’s reduction of customs duties in the multilateral framework, the 
abolishment of textile quotas for the Syrian competitors on the European 
market, the EU enlargement and finally the large number of free trade 
and cooperation agreements the Union has signed with other third states.    
 The agreement can be seen as gaining Syria ‘insurance’ against 
the possibility that the Northern partner arbitrarily resorts to new and 
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non-conventional measures to protect their markets from foreign 
competition (through, for example, the exclusion of antidumping 
provisions in the treaty). The Syrian-European AA, however, in a 
similar manner as all the treaties with the MPCs, allows for 
antidumping, safeguards and countervailing measures. This risks 
severely limiting the ‘insurance effect’ of the AA and future exports to 
the EU especially in those branches and sectors where Syrian 
manufacturers enjoy comparative advantages such as the textiles and 
foodstuffs industries. To make things worse, the provisions for 
antidumping, safeguards and countervailing measures in the AA as such 
do not only offer large scope for discretion but in addition are not 
covered by the dispute settlement mechanism established by the AA. 
Until now however, Syrian exports were not targeted by EU 
antidumping or countervailing measures but the EU initiated in 2001 for 
the first time in its relations with Syria surveillance measures for cotton 
yarn imports originating in Syria (see European Commission 2004a; 
Zorob 2006b). 
 
Table 5: Volume and Structure of Syrian Exports to the EU  
 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Exports to the EU* 
(US$ million) 
3,050 3,382 3,943 3,271 2,897 4,080 4,384 
EU Share in Syrian Exports 
(in percent) 
65.8 70.0 60.3 57.1 53.8 63.2 43.1 
Share of Crude Oil in Exports to the 
EU* 
(in percent) 
92.6 93.5 93.4 91.5 91.9 92.6 84.6 
Non-Oil Exports to the EU 
(US$ million) 
226 221 260 279 235 302 677 
EU Share in Syrian Non-Oil Exports  
(in percent) 
20.6 19.4 14.3 17.0 13.5 14.5 11.8 
Agricultural Exports to the EU 
(SITC 0, 1, 2 and 4 excluding 27, 28) 
(US$ million) 
81 66 96 108 81 138 230 
EU Share in Syrian Agricultural 
Exports  
(in percent) 
13.0 12.5 8.9 11.1 8.2 12.7 10.8 
*2000-2003 = EU (15); 2004-2006 = EU (25). Source: Own 
calculations based on United Nations: UN Comtrade Statistics 
Database. 
 The benefits of the agreement are also qualified by the fact that 
at present, most of Syrian exports to the EU are still made up of crude 
oil while its non-oil exports are increasingly directed to other markets. 
Oil exports account for more than 90 percent of exports to the EU in the 
period 2000-2006 as illustrated in Table 5. Even in 2006, when the share 
of Syrian oil exports to the world in total exports dropped below 45 
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percent, the share of crude oil in exports to the EU remained as high as 
85 percent. The volume of Syrian non-oil exports to the EU more than 
doubled in the period 2000-2006. Since non-oil exports to the world, 
however, have risen nearly sixfold in the same period, the EU share in 
Syrian non-oil exports decreased steadily from more than 20 percent in 
2000 to only 12 % in 2006 despite the EU’s enlargement in 2004. 
Around one third of the non-oil exports destined for the EU market are 
made up of agricultural goods. They account for only a small share in 
total Syrian agricultural exports, hovering around 8-13 percent in the 
period 2000-2006. In foodstuffs and beverages this share is even lower. 
In contrast, countries like Morocco or Tunisia are delivering more than 
half of their total agricultural exports to the EU. 
 Whereas in the case of industrial products, the low 
competitiveness of Syrian goods on the European market could well be 
responsible for their poor export performance, the access of Syrian 
agricultural exports to the EU remains until today heavily restricted. The 
reasons for this are the general high protection of the European 
agricultural market as a result of the Union’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and the low level of concessions granted to Syria for 
agricultural exports in the framework of the 1977 cooperation 
agreement. The product coverage of the concessions amounted to only 
some 16 percent of total agricultural exports to the EU in the period 
2001-2003 compared to 67 percent in the case of Morocco and 72 
percent in the case of Tunisia reflecting that the other MPCs had been 
granted substantially more preferences in their former agreements with 
the EU (Grethe / Nolte / Tangermann 2005: 306). Therefore, a 
significant extension of agricultural concessions in the framework of the 
AA ranked from the beginning as one of the most important claims from 
the Syrian side.    
 With respect to agricultural goods, the AA offers, theoretically, 
an improvement in market access. As measured by the amount of 
products, Syria would get the most concessions for agricultural produce 
among all MPCs. According to the 8-digit level of the Combined 
Nomenclature (CN), tariff reductions without any restrictions are 
granted for 376 goods compared to 46 goods in the agreement with 
Morocco and 61 goods in the AA with Tunisia. It should be mentioned, 
however, that on the one hand the agricultural protocols with Morocco 
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and Tunisia have been renegotiated and extended already (Grethe / 
Tangermann 1999: 17; Grethe / Nolte / Tangermann 2005: 300). 
Lebanon was granted duty-free access for all its agricultural exports to 
the EU except a list of goods (of course the most competitive Lebanese 
agricultural goods on foreign markets) for which quotas have been 
established. On the other hand, only for a part of the above-mentioned 
agricultural goods will customs duties be abolished completely. 
Moreover, for most of those agricultural products which the Syrian 
administration defined as ‘strategic’ and in which it enjoys comparative 
advantages on the international level, such as potatoes, fresh tomatoes, 
oranges, fresh apples and olive oil, annual tariff quotas (TRQs) at zero 
or preferential duty are in most cases limited to certain calendar periods 
and on above-quota exports of these goods full or reduced MFN duties 
will apply. Customs duties on most fisheries originating in Syria will be 
abolished immediately or in the second year of entry into force of the 
Agreement. For selected processed agricultural products TRQs at zero 
duty are granted, whereas for others ad valorem duties will be abolished 
while maintaining specific duties on the agricultural component. For 
those processed agricultural products not listed in Protocol 5 no customs 
duties or quantitative restrictions will apply in the future (see Zorob 
2006b; Hindi 2004). During the third year after entry into force of the 
Agreement, the Parties shall review the situation in order to determine 
further steps for liberalization.  
 It is hoped in Syria that the enlargement of agricultural 
concessions will promote agricultural exports to the EU and thus 
production and employment besides attracting substantial foreign and 
domestic investment to this sector. In addition, increasing agricultural 
exports could contribute to contain a rising deficit in the trade and 
current account balances expected to result from trade liberalization with 
the EU. These expectations were initially based on the fact that there are 
many agricultural products (for example different sorts of fruits and 
vegetables besides olive oil and sheep) in which Syria enjoys a 
comparative advantage on the international level, produces high 
surpluses and at the same time are not or only in small quantities 
exported to the EU. These conditions seem, however, to have changed to 
some extent in recent years. According to Syrian experts, the Iraqi 
market currently absorbs much of the excess production in agricultural 
goods besides a higher demand for foodstuffs on the local market 
generated by the estimated 1.5 million Iraqi refugees living in Syria. In 
spring this year export controls for selected products like tomato were 
even introduced to hold in check spiraling price increases on the local 
market. Moreover, to make effective use of the above mentioned 
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concessions, enhance agricultural exports to the EU in a substantial 
magnitude and attract investment, Syrian farmers must work hard to 
fulfill other conditions required for a successful access to the European 
markets as regards, among others, standards and quality. As many 
authors specializing on Euro-Med agricultural trade have emphasized, 
concessions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for entering the 
European market (see, for instance, García-Alvarez-Coque 2001, 2002). 
Finally, Syria ‘bought’ its new concessions, and in contrast to the other 
MPCs, with an extensive opening of its own agricultural market despite 
warnings expressed in several reports compiled by experts in 
agricultural trade (see García-Alvarez-Coque 2001). Accordingly, one 
might expect more jobs and income in Syrian agriculture to be lost than 
created with implementation of the AA. Syrian experts however do not 
expect Syrian consumers to substitute traditional local produce in 
particular as regards fruits and vegetables with goods coming from the 
EU.   
 Besides the above mentioned erosion of historical preferences, 
restrictive technical barriers to trade like EU standards and quality 
controls, complex rules of origin and the EU’s right to resort to 
measures of contingent protection could seriously impede the AA’s 
effect in securing and enhancing Syrian market access. Differences in 
definitions of product and processing standards between Syria and the 
EU and connected to this the requirement of complex and time-
consuming conformity assessment and certification procedures are 
threatening to increase transactions costs in exports trade with the EU. 
Manufacturers in the foodstuffs, textile and pharmaceutical industries in 
Syria and other countries of the region are complaining about high costs 
associated with the process of complying with European standards and 
specifications and/or about lacking adequate and high-standard domestic 
capacities for conformity assessment. 
 Among the most constraining factors hampering exports as well 
as imports in Syria are traditionally cumbersome and time- and cost-
consuming customs procedures together with red tape (see, for instance, 
Zarrouk 2003). As outlined in section 2.3, Syria committed itself to 
comprehensively reform and modernise customs procedures in line with 
EU and international standards which should make it possible to reduce 
transaction costs for exports as well as for imported inputs and thus to 
 63 
enhance competitiveness of Syrian exports to the EU besides generating 
positive spillover effects to trade with other partners. However, those 
reforms will take time to materialise and like harmonisation of standards 
will require additional funds and expertise.  
 Finally, the impact of the complex and restrictive rules of origin 
(RO) in particular in finished goods and in those industries like textiles 
and apparel on Syrian exports’ market access to the EU as well as 
indirectly on Syria’s ability to attract FDI are at best ambiguous.xxvi In 
the worst case they will seriously hamper it by increasing trade 
transaction costs in trade with the EU to the extent that the duty-free 
access granted to Syrian industrial goods is fully eroded. In many cases 
the reorganization of production processes to comply with rules of 
origin requirements and the costly obligation to prove origin might urge 
manufacturers to accept paying customs duties. In addition, cumulating 
inputs originating in the EU, for example, might deprive Syrian exports 
of competitiveness where they substitute for cheaper inputs coming from 
other, for example Asian or (non-MPC-) Arab countries. For being 
allowed to cumulate inputs from other members of the 
Paneuromediterranean System in addition to the EU, Syria is required to 
conclude FTAs with all of them comprising the same rules of origin 
protocol. Accordingly, in the current situation Syrian manufacturers 
would only be allowed to cumulate inputs originating in Turkey as local 
content for exports to the EU. This is because Syria neither belongs to 
the Agadir Agreement or Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area 
(MAFTA) nor did it conclude FTAs with the remaining non-Arab 
members of the System such as the EFTA countries.  
 Finally, restrictive RO are in general among the major factors 
supporting the establishment of a so-called hub-and-spokes system and 
its risk of diverting investment from the spokes to the hub. Potential 
investors who want to sell predominantly on the market of the large 
country or in this case the EU are induced to locate there because by 
doing so they are not obliged to comply with rules of origin. The risk of 
hub-and-spokes effects can be mitigated by free trade and if possible 
deeper integration among the spokes. For this reason it is extremely 
important for Syria to conclude FTAs with the other partners of the Pan-
Euro-Med System; in particular it needs to foster integration with its 
Southern partners via a potential widening and deepening of GAFTA to 
improve its capability to attract market-seeking FDI and thereby to 
become a sub-regional hub reaching out for neighboring and Gulf 
countries besides serving as a major spot for transit trade. Given that 
GAFTA does not confer the right of cumulation of origin in the 
framework of the Pan-Euro-Med System, Syria should also accede to the 
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Agadir Agreement to be able to benefit from the right of cumulation. 
Finally, in order to urge the EU to simplify rules of origin in the AA, the 
Syrian administration seems to have no other option than to work 
together with the other MPCs and probably rest of members of the Pan-
Euro-Med System and approach the EU as a group.   
 On the other hand, however, Syrian suppliers might benefit 
from the Pan-Euro-Med RO in those branches where the Syrian industry 
maintains fully integrated production chains like for example in cotton 
textiles and apparel. In addition, the Pan-Euro-Med System of 
Cumulation is expected to deliver substantial incentives for Syrian 
industry to develop production and exports of intermediate goods to the 
other members of the System and connected to this attracting FDI into 
those branches.  
 Positive effects of market-access will only materialize in the 
long term and only if the Syrian administration is prepared to implement 
the necessary reforms. In this process, however, the EU could and 
should become a major partner providing the Syrian administration with 
generous financial and technical assistance. As illustrated in Table 6, the 
amounts committed or allocated to Syria in the framework of the MEDA 
programme, the former principal financial instrument of the EU for the 
implementation of the EMP, and its successor the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENPI), are substantially lower than the 
amounts provided for most of the other Arab MPCs.  
Table 6: Assistance in the Framework of MEDA and ENPI (€ million) 
 Algeria  Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia WBG Regional 
MEDA I 
1995-1999 
Commitments 
164 685 257 182 644 107 431 106 211 
MEDA II 
2000-2006 
Commitments 
307 596 314 127 907 207 472 397** 688 
ENPI 
2007-2010 
Allocations 
220 558 265 187 654 130 300 632 343*** 
A* MEDA I 
(€) 
1.07 2.15 10.28 10.41 4.49 1.32 8.99 7.05 0.26 
A* MEDA II 
(€) 
1.43 1.33 8.97 5.18 4.52 1.84 7.02  0.61 
    *A = Average per year per inhabitant.** 2000-2004 only***Regional Programme - South 
Source: European Commission (2007a): ENPI – Funding 2007 – 2013; 
European Commission (2007b): ENPI Regional Strategy Paper 2007 – 2013 
and Regional Indicative Programme 2007 – 2010. 
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This is in particular the case with regard to the per capita ratios shown in 
the last two rows of the table. If actual payments are assessed, the 
picture becomes even worse. Of the amounts committed in the 
framework of MEDA I only one third have been actually disbursed. 
However, loans provided by the EIB to Syria have increased 
considerably in recent years and in particular since the Facility for Euro-
Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) started its 
operations. Although the EU has provided little assistance to the MPCs 
as a group relative to the magnitude of reform and liberalization that 
these countries have committed themselves to within the framework of 
the AAs, it has to be noted, that the Syrian administration itself has to 
take some of the responsibility for the limited amounts committed and 
disbursed. Counted among the major factors responsible for the small 
amount of assistance offered to Syria are problems like low absorption 
capacity or lack of experience of the Syrian administration to coordinate 
development cooperation (Zorob, 2006b; European Commission, 
2007c). 
 To be realistic, one can hardly expect the EU to back up the 
Syrian economy with the same amount of massive financial assistance 
the US government has offered Mexico in the 1990s to help it to escape 
a major balance of payments crisis. Nor can one expect EU assistance to 
compensate for the high short-term adjustment costs which the Syrian 
economy certainly will have to face as a result of opening-up its market. 
This is not to deny, however, that on the one hand EU assistance can be 
expected to be expanded considerably after the AA is signed and started 
implementation. On the other hand EU support mainly in form of 
technical assistance provided to Syria in recent years apparently 
generated some positive effects in restructuring ministries and 
developing local capacity.  
 The National Indicative Programme (NIP) for 2007-2010 
mentions support for political and administrative, economic and social 
reform as priorities for action with a special focus on capacity building 
in all areas (see European Commission 2007c). Assistance to be offered 
in the framework of the current NIP will cover a Trade Enhancement 
Programme offering policy advice and capacity building for trade 
facilitation and trade promotion and a Business Environment 
Simplification Programme with the general target to support the removal 
of the most stringent regulatory and administrative barriers to doing 
business in Syria. Both programmes were approved in late 2007 but the 
signature of their financing agreements seems to be still pending (Syria 
Report 2007). In addition, the EU plans to provide assistance for the 
modernization of Syrian industrial SOEs and their corporatization 
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(Industrial Upgrading and Restructuring Programme) as well as to 
support the Syrian government in developing and implementing social 
protection programmes (Social Protection Programme). EU-funded 
assistance programmes like the Trade Enhancement Programme or the 
Quality & Standards Programme should help add substance to those 
issues which are only defined in broad terms in the AA’s provisions 
such as harmonization of standards and accordingly to improve market 
access of Syrian exports to the EU in the longer run. In addition, 
programmes to assist the establishment of social protection systems and 
the upgrading of the Syrian industry may provide adequate first steps in 
assisting Syria to mitigate to some extent and to come to terms with the 
negative effects to be expected from opening-up the Syrian market to 
European competition. EU assistance however needs not only to be 
significantly expanded in its magnitude. 
 In sum the analysis outlined in the previous sections showed 
that measures of trade and accompanying reforms in other fields of the 
economy enacted in the years since the initialization of the Syrian-
European Association Agreement do not make this agreement 
redundant. Rather, these measures and their impact on the economy in 
the form of increased competition on the Syrian market and related 
efficiency effects should improve the conditions for entering the 
agreement. Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go for Syrian 
decision makers to foster Syria’s integration into the world economy via 
promotion of exports and foreign direct investment. Accordingly, there 
are still many provisions in the agreement with the EU which would 
catalyze a widening and deepening of trade and associated reforms. In 
addition, the treaty with the EU offers an opportunity for the Syrian 
government to credibly “lock-in” the measures of trade reform enacted 
in recent years by a legally binding agreement.  
 This is not to say, however, that the agreement will not be 
harmful for at least parts of the Syrian economy particularly in the short 
to medium term. Given the currently still low level of global 
competitiveness of the Syrian economy in general, opening up to the EU 
will confront the Syrian economy with potentially high losses in income 
and employment as many local firms may not withstand European 
competition. In addition, because of remaining relatively high customs 
duties, there is a substantial risk of trade diversion robbing the Syrian 
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government of tariff revenue losses without delivering efficiency effects 
or benefiting Syrian consumers. The reciprocal liberalization of services 
and opening of public procurement will certainly benefit European 
companies the most. Opportunities for improving market access of 
Syrian exports on the other hand and with them major incentives 
supporting the shift from import-substituting to export-oriented 
production will only emerge in the longer run.  
 Against this background, one may ask if it’s worth the price for 
Syria to sign the new agreement. Alternatively, the Syrian government 
could prefer to stick to the older cooperation agreement which most 
probably will remain in place in case the AA will not be signed. This 
means, however, that Syria won’t benefit from a potential expansion of 
EU financial and technical assistance and improvement of market access 
conditions in the longer term besides other expected dynamic effects of 
the agreement like locking-in reform, stimulating investment and 
increasing competition (for a detailed analysis of these effects see 
another work of the author: Zorob 2006b). In addition, those who want 
to foster and deepen trade liberalization in Syria would forgo the 
opportunity to make use of the AA as an instrument to overcome 
opposition to liberalization. As noted above and despite an acceleration 
of trade reforms in recent years there are still many tariff and in 
particular non-tariff barriers in place the elimination of which will most 
probably challenge a host of vested interests.   
 With or without the AA the Syrian economy is in an urgent 
need of restructuring and to access new sources for growth and 
development apart from oil. Despite all its loopholes and potential 
negative effects the Syrian-European AA might serve as an instrument 
to support the Syrian economy in this way. However, to promote 
alternative sources of growth, to make the agreement with the EU a 
success and to limit short-term adjustment costs the Syrian government 
has no other option but to implement a whole variety of complementary 
reforms. In addition, the EU could do its part and improve the conditions 
of the agreement via, for example, an extension of the transition period 
in opening the Syrian market beyond the 12 years fixed in the AA, a 
further expansion of agricultural concessions and substantially enlarged 
financial and technical assistance. However, a future renegotiation of the 
Syrian-European Association Agreement is from the author’s point of 
view rather unlikely.      
Conclusion 
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Regional integration and in particular an agreement with a large country 
or block ‘in the North’ like the EU may offer a developing country like 
Syria to catalyze and lock in trade reforms besides contributing to the 
promotion of exports and investment and thus adjustment of the 
economy in the longer run. Moreover, it can deliver an instrument to 
overcome political-economic constraints on liberalization. To achieve 
this role and effectively support the developing member’s export-
oriented development, it is crucial that an RIA does not only provide for 
the opening-up of the domestic market to competition of the partners’ 
goods and services. In addition, it should also secure and enhance the 
developing country’s access to the market of the developed member and 
provide technical and financial assistance. 
 In 2003/04 the Syrian foreign trade system had still to be 
classified as being severely restrictive. In addition, the process of reform 
faced formidable constraints among them most importantly domestic 
opposition to liberalization. Confronted with the EU’s unwillingness to 
proceed with the AA, Syrian decision makers opted for a widening and 
deepening of trade reforms on a unilateral basis. Signing the AA will 
confront the Syrian economy with potentially high losses in income and 
employment, a substantial risk of trade diversion and loss of tariff 
revenues while improving market access for Syrian exports only in a 
longer-term perspective. Notwithstanding this, if the Syrian-European 
AA were to come into force, it would still contribute to catalyze a 
widening and deepening of trade and associated reforms and give Syria 
the opportunity to benefit from positive dynamic effects of integration 
such as stimulating investment, promoting transfers of technology and 
enhancing efficiency.  
 
                                                      
xxii I am indebted to Michael Dostal for valuable comments on the first draft 
of this paper presented at the Conference on Economic Reform in Syria, 
University of St. Andrews, as well as to the conference organizer Professor 
Raymond Hinnebusch for his critical review and excellent guidance. 
xxiii It should be noted in this context however that the underlying positive 
nexus between trade and economic growth remains an issue of debate (for this 
discussion see, for instance, World Bank 2005). 
xxiv Measures aimed at liberalising foreign trade encompass the conversion 
and/or elimination of non-tariff barriers to customs duties, simplification of 
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and/or reduction of tariffs and the unification of exchange rates.  However, 
openness to trade is by itself not sufficient for growth. Therefore, trade 
liberalization should be combined with a strategy of export promotion or 
diversification, enhancing the range of goods exported in addition to increasing 
the share of higher value-added industrial goods in a country’s exports. Typical 
export promotion measures comprise of elimination or reduction of export 
taxes, the removal of licences, establishment of free-trade zones, the provision 
of export subsidies and the duty-free sourcing of inputs by introducing schemes 
of duty-drawback (see, for instance, Abdallah 1997, Bender 1995). 
xxv Dynamic or long-term effects of integration are generally regarded as 
being of much higher importance than purely static effects of free trade and in 
particular for developing countries participating in a North-South RIA. 
Important dynamic include scale and competition effects. Market enlargement 
as a result of removing trade barriers between the members of a FTA or CU 
enhances competition on the members’ domestic markets breaking up 
monopolistic market structures and forcing firms to improve efficiency. In 
addition, a larger regional market offers opportunities for exploiting economies 
of scale, scope as well as dynamic economies or learning effects. A further 
advantage of market enlargement is seen in its potential effect on stimulating 
investment and, in particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) with its expected 
positive impact on capital accumulation and transfer of technology. 
Technological or knowledge spillovers spurred by increased investment and 
trade on the basis of regional integration in turn may deliver a mechanism to 
improve prospects of long-term growth. The effect of securing and enhancing 
market access and the effect of locking-in reform are often referred to as the 
main ‘non-traditional’ effects of regional integration. Both are characterized by 
their specific relevance for North-South agreements.  Additional ‘political 
effects’ comprise of the expected impact of regional integration on 
consolidation of peace and security, strengthening of political influence and 
enhancing bargaining power. RIAs can also serve as a platform for regional 
project cooperation as well as technical and financial cooperation (for a more 
detailed discussion see, for instance, Baldwin / Venables 1995; Fernandez / 
Portes 1998; Kennes 2000; Schiff / Winters 2003). 
 
xxvi Rules of origin are designed to identify the ‘economic nationality’ of a 
good. Although rules of origin are indispensable for the implementation of free 
trade between two or more countries on a regional level, they are increasingly 
regarded as NTBs with far-reaching impact on market access. In the Syrian-
European AA the rules of origin form part of a separate protocol. This protocol 
defines for each product at six-digit HS level one or several different conditions 
which have to be fulfilled for a ‘substantial transformation’ based on which the 
product is granted ‘origin status’. Accordingly, the rules of origin in the AA are 
regarded by many as being restrictive. To mitigate the restrictiveness of the 
rules of origin in the agreements between the EU and the MPCs, the 
Paneuromediterranean System of Cumulation of Origin was introduced in 2005. 
Based on this producers in the MPCs are allowed to cumulate inputs originating 
in other member countries of the System as ‘local content’. Cumulation however 
is limited to ‘partial’ (as opposed to ‘full’) cumulation. Members of the 
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Paneuromediterranean System of Cumulation are currently the EU member 
states, MPCs, EFTA countries and EU accession candidates. 
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